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INTERESTS INTO THE DISCUSSION OF 
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS FOR 
VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
 




The landscape of employment law is shifting as states 
increasingly pass legislation that requires employers to afford 
special treatment to employees who are victims of domestic 
violence (“victim-employees”). 1 New Jersey and California 
provide salient examples of this shifting landscape. On July 17,  
2013, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie signed the New 
                                                        
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School,  2015; B.A., Virginia 
Commonwealth University, 2009. I would like to thank my friends, family, 
and roommates for their unwavering support and encouragement while I 
wrote and edited this Note. I am grateful to the editors and members of the 
Journal of Law and Policy for their wisdom, suggestions, and revisions.  
1 See Beth P. Zoller, Domestic Violence Victims Emerging As A New 
Protected Class,  JDSUPRA (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.jdsupra.com/ 
legalnews/domestic-violence-victims-emerging-as-a-42895/. This Note 
considers only employment protections for employees who are themselves 
victims of domestic violence. In fact, the question is far more complicated 
than that.  Many of the laws herein discussed have been amended to apply to 
employees whose family member is a victim of domestic violence.  See, e.g. , 
OR.  REV.  STAT.  § 659A.270(2) (2011) (as amended by 2013 Or. Laws Ch. 
321 (H.B. 2903) (June 6, 2013) (originally applying to a “parent or guardian 
of a minor child or dependent who is a victim of domestic violence”)). Also, 
many of the laws herein discussed apply with equal force to victims of a 
broader swath of intimate partner violence. See, e.g. ,  HAW.  REV.  STAT.  § 
378-71 (2014) (defining covered employees as victims of “domestic abuse, 
sexual assault,  or stalking.”). These distinctions likely have large impacts on 
the employers who are covered by these laws, but this Note does not seek to 
address those issues.  
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Jersey Security and Financial Empowerment Act (“NJ SAFE 
Act”),2 which requires employers to provide any victim-
employee up to twenty days of unpaid leave within a calendar 
year. 3 On October 10, 2013, California Governor Jerry Brown 
signed California Senate Bill 400 (“S.B. 400”),4 which prevents 
employers from discriminating against victim-employees and 
requires employers to reasonably accommodate victim-
employees. 5 The New Jersey and California bills exemplify the 
three current state-level approaches to providing employment 
protections to victim-employees: (1) requiring a statutorily 
defined amount of unpaid leave (“the statutory leave approach”); 
(2) preventing discrimination on the basis of status as a victim of 
domestic violence (“the antidiscrimination approach”); or (3) 
requiring employers to reasonably accommodate victim-
employees (“the reasonable accommodation approach”). 6  
                                                        
2 New Jersey Security and Financial Empowerment Act of 2013, P.L. 
2013, c. 82. 
3  Id.  See also New Jersey SAFE Act Becomes Law,  LABOR & EMP’T 
LAWFLASH (Morgan Lewis LLP, Princeton, N.J.),  Aug. 1, 2013, at 1, 
https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/LEPG_LF_NJSAFEActBecomesLaw_02
aug13.pdf. The NJ SAFE Act came into effect on October 1, 2013. John 
McDonald, Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault,  N.J. Becomes the Latest 
to Provide Leave for Victimized Employees,  FORBES EMP’T BEAT BLOG  
(Sept. 26, 2013, 4:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theemploymentbeat/ 
2013/09/26/domestic-violence-and-sexual-assault-nj-becomes-the-latest-to-
provide-leave-for-victimized-employees/. 
4 Brian E. Ewing, Constangy Brooks & Smith LLP, California Broadens 
Employment Discrimination Prohibitions to Include Victims of Domestic 
Violence and Stalking,  LEXOLOGY (Oct. 16, 2013), 
http://www.lexology.com/ 
library/detail.aspx?g= 6f4f2ba2-5e42-42bc-9641-65d88bb77709. S.B. 400 
came into effect on January 1, 2014 and amended California Labor Law 
sections 230 and 230.1. See CAL.  LAB.  CODE §§ 230, 230.1 (2014). 
5 S.B. 400, 2013–14 Cal. S.,  Reg. Session (Cal. 2013) [hereinafter Cal. 
S.B. 400]. Cal. S.B. 400 added to the Labor Code that “[a]n employer shall 
not discharge or in any manner discriminate or retaliate against an employee 
who is a victim of domestic violence,” and “[a]n employer shall provide 
reasonable accommodations for a victim of domestic violence.” Id.   
6 See generally LEGAL MOMENTUM,  STATE LAW GUIDE: EMPLOYMENT 
RIGHTS FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC OR SEXUAL VIOLENCE (updated June 
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Thirty-four states have passed legislation under one of these 
three approaches. 7 As such, victims of domestic violence are 
rapidly becoming another subset of the population that the law 
sees as deserving of special treatment. 8 The commonality 
between each of the three approaches is that they each require 
employers to provide some form of employment protection—or 
special treatment—to victim-employees.  The primary goal of 
these statutes has been to provide job security for victims of 
domestic violence so that they can become financially 
independent from, and eventually,  leave their abusers. 9 While 
this goal is noble, it begs the question: do these statutes impose 
too great of a cost on employers? 
To date,  employers and their advocates have opposed these 
employment protections. 10 Many commentators have criticized 
this wholesale opposition because domestic violence is not a 
                                                        
2013) [hereinafter LEGAL MOMENTUM,  STATE LAW GUIDE],  available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/160011402/State-Law-Guide-Employment-Rights-
for-Victims-of-Domestic-or-Sexual-Violence (describing the various state and 
local level employment protections available to victims of domestic violence). 
See also Marcy L. Karin, Changing Federal Statutory Proposals to Address 
Domestic Violence at Work Creating A Societal Response by Making 
Businesses A Part of the Solution, 74 BROOK.  L.  REV.  377, 392–95 (2009) 
(discussing trends in state laws). Each of the current state-level approaches 
was modeled off of existing federal law: the statutory leave approach is 
modeled after the Family Medical Leave Act; the antidiscrimination approach 
is modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; and the reasonable 
accommodation approach is modeled after the Americans with Disability Act. 
See Deborah A. Widiss, Domestic Violence and the Workplace: The 
Explosion of State Legislation and the Need for a Comprehensive Strategy,  35 
FLA.  ST.  U.  L.  REV.  669, 700, 707, 709 (2008). 
7 See LEGAL MOMENTUM,  STATE LAW GUIDE,  supra note 6, at 1–36. 
8 Zoller, supra note 1.  
9 See infra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.  
10 See, e.g. ,  Letter from California Chamber of Commerce et al.  to 
Members, California Senate Committee on Judiciary (Apr. 19, 2013) 
[hereinafter California Chamber of Commerce, Letter in Opposition], 
available at 
http://www.calodging.com/images/uploads/pdfs/SB_400_SEN_Jud_Oppose.  
pdf (opposing SB 400 on the behalf of employers). See also Karin, supra 
note 6, at 398 (discussing specific opposition to this type of legislation).  
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purely domestic problem and instead directly affects employers’ 
bottom line11 Although employers do have a valid reason to 
oppose employment protections,  since such protections can 
increase the cost of business, 12 overall those protections are in 
fact beneficial.  When protections are drafted with employers’ 
interests in mind, they can trade small-term costs for long-term 
gains.   
Employers should also recognize that wholesale opposition is 
no longer an effective strategy for a number of reasons.  First, 
there has been an “explosion” of state-level statutes that provide 
employment protections for victim-employees. 13 Over two thirds 
of the states have some form of this statute. 14 Second, the 
federal government has recently signaled two ways that it 
supports providing protections for victims of domestic violence: 
(1) on February 15, 2013, the Office of Personal Management 
                                                        
11 See, e.g.,  Karin, supra note 6, at 383–85.  One possible explanation 
for employer opposition is that it is simple path dependence. This theory 
asserts that because employers have opposed employment protections in the 
past—like unpaid leave for pregnant workers—they blindly continue to do so 
now. Professor Deborah Widiss provides two examples of how path 
dependence may be operating in this area of law. See Widiss, supra note 6, 
at 705, 708–09. First,  Widiss argues that “proposing domestic violence 
victim status as an additional protected class predisposes businesses to oppose 
such bills.” Id.  at 708. Second, Widiss describes how the invocation of a 
statutory leave requirement raises the spectre of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (“FMLA”) and “triggers an assumption” that, like the FMLA, 
these leave laws should exempt smaller businesses. Id.  at 702–05. 
12 Hearing on S.B. 229 Before the S. Comms. on Labor & Pub. Emp’t 
and Hum. Servs. ,  2011 Leg. (Haw. 2011) (letter testimony of Poka Laenui, 
Exec. Dir.,  Wai’anae Coast Comm. Mental Health Ctr.),  available at 
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2011/testimony/SB229_SD1_TESTIMO
NY_LAB-HUS_03-22-11_.PDF. In his letter opposing a 2011 Hawaii Bill 
that amended the state labor code to require employers to afford victims of 
domestic violence reasonable accommodation, Poka Laenui, Executive 
Director of the Wai’anae Coast Community Mental Health Center, argues 
that “this bill [will be used to] transfer upon employers cost of doing business 
the burden of underwriting what is essentially a social-criminal and financial 
societal issue.” Id. 
13 Widiss, supra note 6, at 669, 698. 
14 See LEGAL MOMENTUM,  STATE LAW GUIDE,  supra note 6, at 1–36.  
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(“OPM”) required all federal agencies to prohibit discrimination 
of federal employees on the basis of their status of domestic 
violence;15 and (2) federal agencies have issued guidance for 
how existing federal laws can provide protection to victim-
employees in limited factual scenarios. 16 Rather than continue 
their strategy of wholesale opposition to employment 
protections,  employers and their advocates should support 
limited protections for victim-employees.  Such protections can 
and should be drafted in a manner that ensures that they address 
employer concerns,  while imposing only minimal costs on those 
employers.   
The New York State Senate provides an excellent example of 
how, on the state level,  employers could shape the debate 
around employment protections for victims of domestic violence.  
During its 2013 legislative session,  the New York Senate 
considered two bills. 17 The first,  Bill 2509, would require 
employers “[t]o permit victims of domestic or sexual violence to 
take [up to 90 days] unpaid leave .  .  .  to address on-going 
domestic or sexual violence issues.” 18 The second, Bill 3385, on 
the other hand, would only require employers to provide a 
reasonable amount of leave to victim-employees,  provided that it 
does not cause an undue burden on their operation. 19 It seems 
                                                        
15 See infra Part I.B for a discussion of OPM’s new policy.  
16 Part II of this Note discusses how the U.S. Department of Labor and 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission have issued fact sheets 
demonstrating how existing federal law applies to victims of domestic 
violence.  
17  Katharine H. Parker & Jacqueline M. Dorn, Proskauer Rose LLP, 
LAW360, NY Jumps On Domestic Violence Protection Bandwagon,  LAW360 
(May 15, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/438685/ny-jumps-on-
domestic-violence-protection-bandwagon. See also Bisha A. Nurse, Day 
Pitney LLP, New York Senate Committee Proposes Protected Leave for 
Domestic Violence Victims,  THE EMP’R’S LAW BLOG (Apr. 18, 2013), 
http://www.employerslawblog.com/Entry.aspx?eID= 55.  
18 S.B. 2509, 2013–14 N.Y. S., Gen. Assembly (N.Y. 2013) 
[hereinafter N.Y. 90-Day Leave Bill].  This bill was referred to the Labor 
Committee on January 8, 2014. See New York Senate Bill 2509,  LEGISCAN,  
http://legiscan.com/NY/bill/S02509/2013 (last visited Mar. 5, 2014).  
19  S.B. 3385, 2013–14 N.Y. S., Gen. Assembly (N.Y. 2013) 
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likely that employers would rather provide unburdensome leave 
than three months of leave. This single legislative session 
presents a lucid example of how employer advocacy could mean 
the difference between providing reasonable leave that is not 
overly burdensome or being required to provide up to three 
months of leave.  
This Note creates a blueprint for a fine-tuned law that 
decreases the economic impact of domestic violence, normalizes 
the cost of providing protection, and requires only low-cost 
solutions.  While other scholars have taken the position that some 
statutory approaches present a better solution for employees and 
employers, 20 none have thus far endeavored to catalog the state-
level statutes to show which statutes are deserving of employer 
support.  Examination of how state statutes have dealt with the 
issue so far demonstrates that a federal law could be drafted so 
as to alleviate many of employers’ concerns while 
                                                        
[hereinafter N.Y. Accommodation Bill].  The bill makes clear that one 
required reasonable accommodation is permitting employees to be “absent 
from work for a reasonable time” to seek medical attention, obtain services 
from a victims’ rights organization, obtain counseling, participate in safety 
planning, or obtain legal services. See id. This bill was last referred to the 
Committee on Investigations and Government Operations. See New York 
Senate Bill 3385,  LEGISCAN,  http://legiscan.com/NY/bill/S3385/2013 (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2014). 
20 See, e.g. ,  Widiss, supra note 6, at 718–23. Widiss advocates for a 
targeted and comprehensive approach that pairs sets of legislation to address 
the goals of employees, employers, and the general public. Id.  Widiss 
provides three examples of such pairings: first,  coupling a law that would 
make status as a victim of domestic violence a protected classification with 
workplace restraining orders, id.  at 720; second, drafting unpaid leave and 
unemployment issuance statutes to provide protections based on employer 
size, id.  at 720–21; and third, using unemployment issuance statues in 
conjunction with reasonable accommodation statues so that when an 
accommodation would represent an undue burden on the employer,  the 
employee is still protected, id.  at 721. See also Elissa Stone, Comment, How 
the Family and Medical Leave Act Can Offer Protection to Domestic Violence 
Victims in the Workplace,  44 U.S.F.  L.  REV.  729, 736 (2010) (advocating for 
the statutory leave approach); but cf.  Lisalyn R. Jacobs & Maya Raghu, The 
Need for A Uniform Federal Response to the Workplace Impact of 
Interpersonal Violence,  11 GEO.  J.  GENDER & L. 593, 607 (2010) (arguing 
that the statutory leave approach is inadequate on its own).  
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accommodating their economic interests.   
Part I describes how domestic violence affects employers’ 
bottom line, and how consequently,  employers have an 
economic interest in employment protections for victims of 
domestic violence. Part I also asserts that internal policies are 
insufficient to deal with the costs of domestic violence because 
such policies unfairly create extra costs for proactive employers.  
Part II shows how existing federal law ignores employers’ 
interests while providing victim-employees with protection. Part 
III explores the statutory leave approach and discusses how key 
statutory provisions can solve employer concerns without great 
cost.  Part IV discusses the weaknesses of the antidiscrimination 
approach. Part V explores the reasonable accommodation 
approach and discusses the ways the approach inherently 
addresses employers’ interests and concerns.  Part VI concludes 
with a summary of the statutory provisions that employers 
should consider supporting.  
 
I.  EMPLOYERS HAVE AN ECONOMIC INTEREST IN EMPLOYMENT 
PROTECTIONS FOR VICTIM-EMPLOYEES AND INTERNAL 
POLICIES ARE INADEQUATE TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM.   
 
Prior to a discussion about which statutory approaches would 
best address employer interests,  two questions must be 
answered: First,  do employers have an interest in addressing 
domestic violence in the lives of their employees? Second, why 
are employers unable to address this problem internally?  
 
A. Domestic Violence Directly and Indirectly Affects 
Employers’ Bottom Line 
 
The first question—should employers really support 
employment protections for victims of domestic violence?—may 
seem callous,  but the answer should not be treated as a foregone 
conclusion.  Clearly,  domestic violence affects every aspect of a 
victim’s life.21 Domestic violence is—at root—about the abuser 
                                                        
21 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Domestic Violence Law Reform in the 
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controlling,  dominating, and coercing the victim. 22 Domestic 
violence can take the form of economic control, 23 or it can start 
at home and then spill into the victim’s work life. 24 It is 
estimated that “a staggering twenty-nine percent of male and 
forty percent of female workers report[] having been subjected 
to intimate partner violence at some point in their lives.”25 
While criminal codes have long protected victims’ physical 
safety,  there have been fewer legal solutions for the ways that 
domestic violence affects a victim’s ability to attain or maintain 
a job. 26 Over time, states have adopted laws to address the 
economic instability in the lives of those affected by domestic 
violence, primarily by providing victims with employment 
protections. 27 A driving theory behind these statutes is that by 
                                                        
Twenty-First Century: Looking Back and Looking Forward,  42 FAM.  L.Q. 
353, 354 (2008) (arguing that domestic violence impacts every aspect of 
victims’ lives and “every aspect of the law including criminal law, torts, 
reproductive rights, civil rights, employment law, international human rights, 
and especially family law.”). For qualitative studies of how actual victims’ 
lives are impacted see, for example, Robin R. Runge, The Legal Response to 
the Employment Needs of Domestic Violence Victims an Update,  HUM.  RTS. ,  
Summer 2010, at 13 [hereinafter Runge, Employment Needs Update] and 
Jennifer E. Swanberg & T. K. Logan, Domestic Violence and Employment: A 
Qualitative Study,  10 J.  OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL.  3, 3 (2005).  
22 Schneider, supra note 21, at 356.  
23 Id.   
24 Jessie Bode Brown, The Costs of Domestic Violence in the 
Employment Arena: A Call for Legal Reform and Community-Based 
Education Initiatives,  16 VA.  J.  SOC.  POL’Y & L. 1, 21–24 (2008). Brown 
discusses how domestic violence can spill into the workplace in the following 
ways: the victim-employee misses work “because of the abuse [he or she] 
faces at home;” the abuser calls the victim-employee while he or she is at 
work; the abuser is a coworker who abuses the victim-employee at work; or 
the abuser shows up at the victim-employee’s workplace and perpetrates 
violence there. Id.  at 17. There is also ample evidence that domestic violence 
affects a victim-employee’s productivity while at work.  See infra notes 42–
60 and accompanying text.  
25 Jacobs & Raghu, supra note 20, at 597.  
26 See Brown, supra note 24, at 2. 
27 See Ill. S. Transcript, 93rd Gen. Ass.,  Reg. Sess. No. 49 (2003).  On 
the floor of the Illinois State Senate, then-state senator Barack Obama 
described the Victims’ Economic Security and Safety Act, 820 ILL.  COMP.  
2014.05.19 DURBIN.DOCX 5/27/2014  11:30 AM 
 ACCOMMODATING EMPLOYERS’ INTERESTS 853 
facilitating job retention,  victims are more likely to become 
financially independent, 28 and thereby more likely to end the 
cycle of violence in their lives.29   
While it is clear that violence directly and indirectly affects 
victims’ lives,  it is less intuitive that employers are similarly 
affected. 30 In fact,  domestic violence can directly affect 
employers,  as evidenced by the tragic murder of Zina 
Haughton. 31 When Zina’s husband, Radcliffe Haughton, became 
increasingly violent at home, and even came to her work and 
slashed her tires,  she filed a restraining order. 32 Four days later, 
Radcliffe again came to Zina’s work and started a fire inside the 
workplace with a propane tank. 33 He then shot his estranged 
wife and six other women, killing a total of four, including 
himself. 34 While some scholars assert that incidents like these 
                                                        
STAT.  § 180/30 (2003), as “a modest attempt to deal with the problems that 
victims face after [the] violence has occurred.”  Ill.  S. Transcript, 93rd Gen. 
Ass., Reg. Sess. No. 49 (2003). See also, e.g. ,  N.Y.C.  ADMIN.  CODE § 8-
107.1 (McKinney 2013). In the legislative findings section of the New York 
City Human Rights Law, the City Council states, “In recent years, a growing 
body of evidence has documented the devastating impact of domestic violence 
on the ability of victims . .  .  to participate fully in the economy.” Id.   
28 See Widiss, supra note 6, at 675–76. 
29 See, e.g. ,  WASH.  REV.  CODE § 49.76.010 (2013) (stating, in the 
legislative findings of the Washington domestic leave law, that “[o]ne of the 
best predictors of whether a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault,  or 
stalking will be able to stay away from an abuser is his or her degree of 
economic independence”).  
30 See Julie Goldscheid, Gender Violence and Work: Reckoning with the 
Boundaries of Sex Discrimination Law,  18 COLUM.  J.  GENDER & L. 61, 77–
78 (2008).  
31 Dinesh Ramde, Radcliffe Haughton Had History of Abuse; Killed 3, 
Himself At Azana Day Spa In Wisconsin,  HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 22, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/22/radcliffe-haughton-profile-
abuse_n_2000235.html. 
32 Greg Botelho, Wisconsin Police: After Domestic Violence Arrest, 
Suspect Kills 3—and Himself, CNN (Oct. 22, 2012),  http://www.cnn.com/ 
2012/10/21/us/wisconsin-shooting/index.html. 
33 Id.   
34 Id.  
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are “relatively uncommon,”35 when polled, the overwhelming 
majority of corporate security officials report concern that 
domestic violence directly threatens the safety of their 
workplaces. 36 Workplace incidents like this can lead to bad press 
and massive tort liability for employers. 37  
Domestic violence can also directly increase the employer’s 
business costs even when the violence occurs elsewhere.  An 
abuser will often attempt to weaken the victim’s economic 
independence by disrupting his or her job performance.38 
According to one study fifty-six percent of victims report being 
harassed while at work by their abuser.39 It has been observed 
that an abuser’s controlling behavior may actually impact victim-
employees’ productivity more than the violence itself. 40 
                                                        
35 See, e.g. ,  Widiss, supra note 6, at 686. But see Stacy M. Downey & 
Amy Johns, New Study Examines the Role of Intimate Partner Violence in 
Workplace Homicides Among U.S. Women,  CTRS.  FOR DISEASE CONTROL &  
PREVENTION,  http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/updates/upd-05-03-12.html. (citing a 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) study finding 
that the second cause of violent death for female employees while working is 
homicide perpetrated by an intimate partner or relative); Swanberg & Logan, 
supra note 21, at 14 (“The majority of women from this study reported that 
their abusers had shown up at work at some point during the last 2 years.”).  
36 In the legislative findings of the Illinois Victims’ Economic Security 
and Safety Act, lawmakers found that “[n]inety-four percent of corporate 
security and safety directors at companies nationwide rank domestic violence 
as a high security concern.” 820 ILL.  COMP.  STAT.  180/5(23) (2012).  
37 See John E. Matejkovic, Which Suit Would You Like? The Employer’s 
Dilemma in Dealing with Domestic Violence,  33 CAP.  U.  L.  REV.  309, 312–
34 (2004). Essentially, claims against the employer would sound in 
negligence, id.  at 313, under the theory that employers owe employees and 
patrons a duty to protect them from foreseeable danger, id.  at 314. These 
actions can yield six-digit price tags for employers. Id.  at 313 (“Because the 
employer had been warned of the husband’s threats and the employer did not 
beef up security, the jury awarded the plaintiffs $5 million.”).  
38 See Maria Amelia Calaf, Breaking the Cycle: Title VII, Domestic 
Violence, and Workplace Discrimination,  21 LAW & INEQ.  167, 170 (2003). 
39 GEN.  ACCOUNTING OFFICE,  DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PREVALENCE AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT AMONG WELFARE RECIPIENTS 8 (1998), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99012.pdf.  
40 Swanberg & Logan, supra note 21, at 14 (“Women’s responses 
implied that stalking at work caused significant levels of stress and 
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Qualitative studies of how domestic violence affects the 
workplace reveal examples of abusers “physically restraining a 
partner from going to work .  . .  ,  making a car unavailable,  or 
cutting up work clothes”41 and “inflict[ing] visible injuries, 
reneg[ing] on promises to provide child care,  or keep[ing] the 
victim up late at night the day before a critical event like an 
exam or a meeting.”42 These kinds of activities not only hurt the 
employee, but the bottom line of the victim’s employer as well. 
The Bureau of National Affairs estimated that,  as a result of 
domestic violence, employers lose between $3 and $5 billion due 
to lost employee productivity.43 Others estimate that employers 
lose up to $13 billion per year in profits because of domestic 
violence. 44  
Domestic violence also has indirect effects on an employer’s 
business costs.  These indirect effects include detrimental 
employee health,  absenteeism, and turnover. 45 The 2010 
National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, 
promulgated by the Center for Disease Control (“CDC”), found 
that domestic violence victims suffered health effects beyond the 
scrapes and bruises of violence, including “frequent headaches,  
                                                        
psychological discomfort that in turn significantly affected job performance. 
In fact, the content of respondents’ discussions that focused on the 
ramifications associated with being stalked while at work led us to surmise 
that the abusers’ stalking behavior produced more anxiety and stress for 
women than actual physical actions taken by abuser prior to work.” 
(emphasis added)). This can occur for one of two reasons.  First,  the 
employee is concerned that his or her abuser will terrorize him or her at 
work. Id.  Second, the employee’s productivity is lessened because of the 
residual stress from an earlier incident. See Carole Warshaw et al. ,  Mental 
Health Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence,  in INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE: A HEALTH BASED PERSPECTIVE 147, 150, 161 (Connie Mitchell 
& Dierdre Anglin, eds.,  2009). 
41 Goldscheid, supra note 30, at 75 (citing Swanberg & Logan, supra 
note 21, at 6–8).  
42 Calaf, supra note 38, at 171 (citations omitted). 
43 Illinois Victims’ Economic Security and Safety Act, 820 ILL.  COMP.  
STAT.180/5 (2012).  
44 Id.  
45 See Brown, supra note 24, at 24; see also AM.  INST.  ON DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE,  http://www.aidv-usa.com/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).   
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chronic pain,  difficulty with sleeping,  . .  .  asthma, irritable 
bowel syndrome, and diabetes.” 46 Studies document that victims 
suffer escalating emotional trauma and thus require psychiatric 
care. 47 Two commentators estimate that employers pay up to 
hundreds of millions of dollars in health care costs because of 
the adverse health effects caused by domestic violence. 48 In 
2003, the CDC found that female victims “lose nearly 8.0 
million days of paid work each year,” which “is the equivalent 
of 32,114 full-time jobs each year.”49 This pervasive 
absenteeism disrupts the workplace and the employer’s 
operations. 50 
                                                        
46 NATIONAL CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, 
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY,  2010 
SUMMARY REPORT,  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ 
violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_executive_summary-a.pdf. 
47 See Warshaw et al. , supra note 40, at 148–50. It is also important to 
note the escalating nature of emotional damage; the crippling mental and 
emotional effects of domestic violence in turn make the victim more 
susceptible to worsening emotional abuse as well as less likely to seek 
available resources. Id.  at 149–50, 155–56. 
48 Jane A. Randel & Kimberly K. Wells, Corporate Approaches to 
Reducing Intimate Partner Violence Through Workplace Initiatives,  3 CLINICS 
OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL.  MED.  821, 821–22 (2003). 
49 CTR.  FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,  DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUM.  SERVS. ,  COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN 
THE UNITED STATES 19 (2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
violenceprevention/pdf/ipvbook-a.pdf. 
50 Congress reached the same conclusions after hearings for the Violence 
Against Women Act.  See Brief for Arizona and Thirty-Seven Other States as 
Amici Curie Supporting Petitioner, United States v. Morrison,  529 U.S. 598 
(1999) (No. 99-5), 1999 WL 1032809, at *5 (“Congress found that violence 
against women imposes significant costs on employers by increasing 
absenteeism, lowering productivity, increasing health care costs, and creating 
higher turnover.”); id.  at *7 (“Congress also found that employers have 
responded to the effect on ‘such bottom line issues as tardiness, poor 
performance, increased medical claims, interpersonal conflicts in the 
workplace, depression, stress and substance abuse’ by directly addressing 
domestic violence in order to reduce their costs and protect their 
employees.”) (quoting Domestic Violence: Hearing on S.  596 Before the Sen. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 15 (1993) (statement of James 
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Domestic violence also causes high employee turnover.51 
This can occur in several ways. First,  “homicide is a leading 
cause of death in the workplace.” 52 Over a quarter of these 
murders are committed by an intimate partner or close relative. 53 
Second, domestic violence affects every aspect of the victim’s 
life that makes it difficult to maintain employment. 54 Third, 
managers see victim-employees’ pervasive absenteeism as 
disruptive to the workplace,  which, without employment 
protections in place,  can lead to the employee’s termination. 55 
The high rates of employee turnover associated with domestic 
violence increase employers’ business costs as “well-trained 
employees are a valuable asset and .  .  .  training new employees 
is more costly than retaining a productive and knowledgeable 
existing workforce.”56 
Domestic violence’s effect on employers extends beyond the 
disruption it causes to the particular victim; it also affects the 
productivity of victims’ coworkers.57 For example,  coworkers 
surveyed in Pennsylvania reported that victim-employees more 
often came to work late,  left early, and took frequent breaks. 58 
About half of these coworker employees report that they felt 
                                                        
Hardeman, Polaroid Corp.)).   
51 See id.  at *6. 
52 Id.  at *6 n.3 (citing AFSCME & AFL-CIO, Hidden Violence Against 
Women at Work,  WOMEN IN PUB.  SERV. ,  Fall 1995, at 1).  
53 Id.  (citing R.  BACHMAN & L.E.  SALTZMAN,  DEP’T OF JUSTICE,  
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE REDESIGNED SURVEY 4 
(1995)). 
54 See Randel & Wells, supra note 48, at 823.  
55 See David K. Haase, Evaluating the Desirability of Federally 
Mandated Parental Leave,  22 FAM.  L.Q. 341, 349 (1988). This point is 
explored in greater detail in Part V.B.3. See infra notes 170–75, 296–99 and 
accompanying text.  
56 See Randel & Wells, supra note 48, at 823. 
57 See STANDING FIRM,  EFFECT OF PARTNER VIOLENCE ON THE 
WORKPLACE: A SURVEY OF EMPLOYED ADULTS IN SOUTHWESTERN 
PENNSYLVANIA 6–8 (May 2013), available at http://www.caepv.org/ 
membercenter/files/survey_ report--exec_summary_only_w_sf_cover.pdf. 
58 Id. at 7. 
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compelled to cover the work of victims and/or abusers, 59 and a 
similar percentage felt that “company resources .  .  .  [were used] 
to deal with or deliver .  . .  abuse.”60 Thus,  domestic violence 
causes decreased productivity in the victim-employees and their 
coworkers.   
In sum, domestic violence has powerful direct and indirect 
economic effects on the victims’ workplace. Due to these 
economic effects employers have an economic interest in 
solutions that provide employees with the opportunity to end the 
cycle of violence in their lives.61 
 
B. The Government and Business’s Growing Support for 
Considering Domestic Violence a Workplace Issue 
 
Many employers are already aware of the effect that 
domestic violence has on their workplace. 62 In 2007, the 
Corporate Alliance to End Partner Violence documented 
corporate opinions of the effect of domestic violence on the 
workplace and the economy. 63 The study revealed that sixty-
three percent of polled CEOs considered domestic violence a 
major problem, and forty-three percent of CEOs and ninety-one 
percent of employees reported an effect on the company’s 
                                                        
59 Id. at 7–8. 
60 Id. at 8. 
61 See Randel & Wells, supra note 48, at 823. 
62 820 ILL.  COMP.  STAT.  180/5(24) (2012). In passing the Illinois 
Victims’ Economic Security and Safety Act, the General Assembly found, 
“[49%] of senior executives recently surveyed said domestic violence has a 
harmful effect on their company’s productivity, 47% said domestic violence 
negatively affects attendance, and 44% said domestic violence increases 
health care costs.” Id. See also Randel & Wells, supra note 48, at 826, 829–
34 (describing what employers can do and have done to internally address the 
effect of domestic violence on employer profits). 
63 CORPORATE ALLIANCE TO END PARTNER VIOLENCE ET AL. ,  2007 CEO 
AND EMPLOYEE SURVEY 2 (Sept. 2007) [hereinafter 2007 CORPORATE 
ALLIANCE SURVEY],  available at http://www.caepv.org/membercenter/ 
files/ceo_survey_results_overview.ppt (compiling and comparing two studies 
on domestic violence: the first polled 200 CEOs and/or official designees of 
Fortune 1500 companies, and the second randomly polled 500 employees).  
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bottom line.64 
Recognizing the negative impact domestic violence has on 
their businesses,  some employers have begun to adopt internal 
policies to assist their employees who are victims. 65 This 
includes the nation’s largest employer—the federal government.66 
On April 12, 2012, President Barack Obama issued a 
Memorandum calling on the federal government to provide 
protection for federal victim-employees. 67 This Memorandum 
directed the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) to issue 
guidance to each federal agency to modify its internal policies so 
as to address the effects of domestic violence. 68 Accordingly,  on 
February 15, 2013, the OPM directed federal agencies to 
develop or modify internal policies to address the effects of 
domestic violence on federal agencies. 69 OPM’s directive 
                                                        
64 Id.  at 6–7. 
65 See Runge, Employment Needs Update,  supra note 21, at 14 (“It is 
more and more common for employment policies and collective bargaining 
agreements to specifically mention benefits for victims of violence.”); 
Widiss, supra note 6, at 685 (describing “the growing number of businesses 
that are voluntarily taking steps to address domestic violence . . .  .”).   For 
concrete examples of the policies that employers have adopted see infra notes 
76–81 and accompanying text.  
66 Parker & Dorn, supra note 17.  
67 Memorandum from the White House Office of the Press Sec’y to the 
Heads of Exec. Dep’t & Agencies (Apr. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Presidential 
Memo on Domestic Violence], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2012/04/18/presidential-memorandum-establishing-policies-
addressing-domestic-violen. 
68 Id.  Specifically, the Presidential Memo on Domestic Violence directed 
the OPM to promulgate: “recommended steps agencies can take as employers 
for early intervention in and prevention of domestic violence committed 
against or by employees, guidelines for assisting employee victims, leave 
policies relating to domestic violence situations, general guidelines on when it 
may be appropriate to take disciplinary action against employees who commit 
or threaten acts of domestic violence, measures to improve workplace safety 
related to domestic violence, and resources for identifying relevant best 
practices related to domestic violence.” Id.   
69 U.S.  OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT. ,  GUIDANCE FOR AGENCY-SPECIFIC 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,  SEXUAL ASSAULT,  AND STALKING POLICIES 1–3, 8 
(Feb. 2013). 
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included guidance on how these policies should be developed 
and enacted. 70 OPM directed every policy to consider the need 
to provide leave, the importance of nondiscrimination against 
victim-employees,  the need for training and awareness,  and the 
role of safety and building security. 71 The directive also directed 
that “to the greatest extent possible,  agencies should work in 
collaboration with the employee to provide leave and/or other 
workplace flexibilities to help the employee remain safe and 
maintain his or her work performance.”72 The new federal 
protection is in line with similar protections for employees of 
state and local governments. 73 President Obama stated that these 
protections should “act as a model” for private sector 
employers. 74 
Not all employers need the federal government to provide a 
model; many companies have adopted internal policies that 
provide protections to victim-employees. 75 These policies include 
facility safety improvements,  internal counseling, and external 
referrals for the victims. 76 Verizon Wireless in their Employee 
Code of Business Conduct,  for example,  declares that domestic 
violence is a workplace issue and encourages employees to come 
forward with their domestic violence issues. 77 This simple policy 
                                                        
70 Id.  at 8–10.  
71 Id.  at 11–27.  
72 Id.  at 11. 
73 See generally LEGAL MOMENTUM,  STATE LAW GUIDE,  supra note 6.  
74 See Presidential Memo on Domestic Violence, supra note 67.  
75 See, e.g. ,  Runge, Employment Needs Update,  supra note 21, at 13–
14. 
76 JULIE GOLDSCHEID & ROBIN RUNGE,  EMPLOYMENT LAW AND 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 9–10 (2009), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domesticviolence/Publ
icDocuments/ABA_CDV_Employ.authcheckdam.pdf; Stacey Pastel Dougan 
& Kimberly K. Wells, Domestic Violence: Workplace Policies And 
Management Strategies,  QUARTERLY E-NEWSLETTER (ABA Comm. on 




77 Best Practices—Verizon Wireless,  CORP.  ALLIANCE TO END PARTNER 
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change can serve as “the starting point for fostering trust.” 78 
Other examples of employer policies include State Farm 
permitting flexible work hours and special time-off policies for 
victims of domestic violence79 and Cigna holding an annual 
“Worksite Violence/Partner Violence Month.”80 The Corporate 
Alliance to End Partner Violence surveyed effective employer 
policies and suggested policies that “[d]efine a policy for flexible 
work hours” and “[c]onsider what special accommodations may 
be able [available] for victims.” 81  In addition to adopting 
internal policies,  industry leaders have also formed advocacy 
groups such as Employers Against Domestic Violence82 and the 
Corporate Alliance to End Partner Violence83 to collectively 
advocate for protections for victims of domestic violence.  
                                                        
VIOLENCE,  http://www.caepv.org/getinfo/bestprac.php?memID= 49 (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2014) [hereinafter Verizon Wireless Best Practices].   
78 Id.   
79 Best Practices—State Farm Insurance Companies,  Corp. Alliance to 
End Partner Violence, http://www.caepv.org/getinfo/bestprac.php? 
memID= 89 (last visited Mar. 27, 2014) [hereinafter State Farm Best 
Practices]. 
80 Best Practices—Cigna,  Corp. Alliance to End Partner Violence, 
http://www.caepv.org/membercenter/files/creatingapvworkplacepolicy.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2014) [hereinafter Cigna Best Practices]. 
81 2007 CORPORATE ALLIANCE SURVEY,  supra note 63. 
82 Employers Against Domestic Violence is a Massachusetts alliance of 
corporate partners, victim rights organizations, and governmental agencies, 
“[c]ommitted to proactively addressing the causes and effects of violence in 
the workplace.” Who We Are,  EMP’RS.  AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,  
http://employersagainstdomesticviolence.org/about/who-we-are/ (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2014). It includes business leaders, such as Blue Cross Blue Shield 
of Massachusetts, the Boston Red Sox, John Hancock Financial Services 
Liberty Mutual Group, Massachusetts General Hospital, Verizon Wireless, 
and many others. See Membership Organizations,  EMP’RS.  AGAINST 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,  http://employersagainstdomesticviolence.org/member-
organizations/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).  
83 The Corporate Alliance to End Partner Violence is comprised of 
business leaders, such as Chase Bank, Lincoln Mutual Life Insurance Co., 
the National Football League, Prudential,  State Farm Insurance Companies, 
and the Target Corporation. Our Members,  CORP.  ALLIANCE TO END 
PARTNER VIOLENCE,  http://www.caepv.org/about/members.php (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2014). 
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These internal policies and advocacy groups indicate that 
some employers are beginning to recognize that they have an 
economic interest in ensuring there are adequate protections for 
victim-employees. 84 One such solution,  which some employers 
are enacting, is accommodations for victims. 85 The new 
protections for federal employees should be viewed as a shift in 
federal policy, which could have important ramifications for 
businesses. 86 Given the growing consensus in corporate and 
government sectors,  it is not difficult to imagine a federal law 
that treats domestic violence as a workplace issue and requires 
employers to bear additional costs. 87 It would therefore be 
shrewd of employers to decide now which employment 
protection best accommodates their interests without imposing 
greater costs.   
 
C. Legislation Would Spread the Cost of Protecting 
Employees.   
 
The prevalence of these organizations and internal policies 
begs the salient question: do employers need a law to tell them 
to do what they are already doing? Allowing employers to solve 
                                                        
84 Dougan & Wells, supra note 76, at 2. Of course, employers are not 
unanimous in their recognition that domestic violence is a workplace issue. 
See Meg Hobday, Domestic Violence Comes to Work: The Need for A Work-
Related Response,  67 BENCH & BAR OF MINN. ,  no. 3, Mar. 2010, at 20, 22 
(“According to a 2005 Survey of Workplace Violence Prevention, only 29.1 
percent of businesses have policies addressing workplace violence generally, 
and less than half of those address domestic violence specifically.”). Many 
employers still oppose treating domestic violence as a workplace issue. Parts 
III,  IV, and V address some of the arguments that employers have raised in 
opposition to treating employment. 
85 Both the State Farm policy and the recommendation provided by the 
Corporate Alliance to End Partner Violence discussed above are examples of 
this. See 2007 CORPORATE ALLIANCE SURVEY,  supra note 63; State Farm 
Best Practices,  supra note 79. 
86 See Parker & Dorn, supra note 17.  
87 See generally Karin, supra note 6 (discussing how reframing the issue 
as a workplace issue is more likely to garner public support, the support of 
the business community, and the support of the federal government).  
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domestic violence issues with internal policies alone presents 
several problems. First,  the majority of employers have no 
internal policies. 88 Second, studies show that even when internal 
policies exist,  employees are often unaware of them. 89 Third, 
there is compelling evidence that employers tend to 
underestimate the prevalence of domestic violence in their 
staff.90 Fourth,  adopting a policy may cause the employer to 
incur costs that might decrease its competitiveness in the 
market.91 Finally,  smaller employers are often without the 
resources to adopt internal policies to deal with the problems of 
domestic violence. 92   
The last two issues presented by only having internal policies 
are of greatest concern for employers. First, an employer who 
provides her employees a protection that is not required by 
statute is incurring an additional business cost. 93 As is discussed 
below, this cost will generally be minor,94 but it should not be 
ignored. At times, employers adopt internal policies out of a 
natural sense of wanting to protect employees. 95 An employer 
that adopts a policy that affords extra accommodations to victim-
                                                        
88 See A. Kevin Troutman, How Employers Should Address Domestic 
Violence at Work,  FISCHER & PHILLIPS LLP (Dec. 3, 2012), 
http://www.laborlawyers.com/how-employers-should-address-domestic-
violence-at-work.  
89 See 2007 CORPORATE ALLIANCE SURVEY,  supra note 63, at 6 (finding 
that “72% of executives say their companies offer programs and services that 
address domestic violence but less than half of employees (47%) are even 
aware of this fact”).  
90 See Widiss, supra note 6, at 682.  
91 See Goldscheid, supra note 30, at 120.  
92 See Karin, supra note 6, at 418.   
93 See Goldscheid, supra note 30, at 120 (discussing the costs associated 
with accommodation statutes). 
94 See id. (“[These] costs generally will be modest.”);  see also infra 
notes 238–48 and accompanying text.   
95 See, e.g. ,  Betsy Weintraub, The Hidden Safety Hazard— 
Domestic Violence,  FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP (Nov. 1, 2012), 
http://www.laborlawyers.com/the-hidden-safety-hazard-domestic-violence 
(advising employer clients to adopt policies because “[a]s a human being, 
[they] have an even bigger responsibility to watch out for dangers to your 
employees .  .  .  .”).  
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employees incurs a cost that is in addition to industry-wide costs 
of business. 96 As such, the employer is potentially penalized in 
the market for what is essentially a moral decision.    
The second concern—that smaller resource-poor employers 
are unable to introduce domestic violence policies—is related. 97 
Smaller employers have a double bind: either adopt internal 
policies,  which they cannot afford, or continue to allow 
domestic violence to affect their bottom line.  Thus, where there 
is no statutory employment protection for victims of domestic 
violence, employers who adopt an internal domestic violence 
policy and small employers are penalized by the unregulated 
marketplace.  Professors Marcy Karin and Deborah Widiss argue 
that the issue should be framed as a public health issue in which 
all of society has a stake. 98 If you look at domestic violence 
through this lens it allows you to view a putative federal 
employment law as a common cost of business that all 
employers should pay, not merely those that elect to or can 
afford to.99 Legislation would redistribute the cost of protecting 
victims and make employment protections a cost of doing 
business.  
 
II.  EXISTING FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT LAWS ONLY HAVE A 
LIMITED APPLICATION TO THE ISSUES RAISED BY DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE’S EFFECT ON THE WORKPLACE. 
 
The problem should now be clear: domestic violence is not 
merely a domestic problem; instead, it directly and indirectly 
affects employers’ bottom line. 100 While some employers are 
able to address domestic violence with internal policies,  those 
                                                        
96 See Goldscheid, supra note 30, at 120. 
97 See Karin, supra note 6, at 418. 
98 Karin, supra note 6, at 399–400 (“Making this change would broaden 
the conversation on this issue beyond the current focus on expanding 
protections for victims . .  .  .”); Widiss, supra note 6, at 693–94 (suggesting 
an alternative to a cost-benefit analysis).  
99 Widiss, supra note 6, at 685–86. 
100 See supra Part I.A. 
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policies represent an extra cost of business. 101 Further,  resource-
poor businesses are unlikely to assume the cost of broad 
employment protections in light of an unregulated market. 102 
There are also likely shortsighted employers that would rather 
avoid the short-term costs of an employment policy than reap the 
benefit of ameliorating the effect of domestic violence on their 
workplace.   Given these concerns,  scholars have asserted that 
employers have an interest in federal legislation that normalizes 
the cost of providing victim-employees with some form of 
protection.103 The question then becomes how should the law 
address these issues?  
There is a valid question as to whether this issue should be 
resolved at the state or federal level. 104 So far, legislation has 
only been passed at the state level. 105 In recent years federal bills 
have been introduced into both houses of Congress,  but these 
attempts have not progressed. 106 If employers and their advocates 
were to begin to advocate for limited employment protections 
for victims of domestic violence, they would need to determine 
whether their interests are better served by a federal or state 
                                                        
101 See supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text. 
102 See, e.g. ,  Widiss, supra note 6, at 726 (arguing that in an 
unregulated market—one without a statute that requires an employer to 
provide some form of protection to employees—“certain costs are too great 
for at least some employers to bear”);  see also supra notes 97, 98 and 
accompanying text. 
103 Widiss, supra note 6, at 726 (“Recognizing the larger public interests 
at stake, legislatures should consider public funding, or other cost-spreading 
mechanisms, to supplement costs that they deem unreasonable for either 
individual employers or individual employees to bear as a result of a 
perpetrator of domestic violence’s criminal actions.”). 
104 See Karin, supra note 6, 379 (arguing that a federal statute is better 
suited to address the problem).  
105 Parts III, IV, and V of this Note describe the statutes that have been 
passed at the state level.  
106 See Robin R. Runge, The Evolution of A National Response to 
Violence Against Women,  24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 429, 453 (2013) 
(describing early efforts to have the Violence Against Women Act include 
employment protections for victims of domestic violence); Widiss, supra note 
6, at 703 n.113 (describing more recent federal bills that would require 
employers to grant employment protections for victims of domestic violence).  
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statute.  This Note avoids that question and instead focuses only 
on the issue at a federal level. 107 As the 2013–14 New York 
state legislative session shows, 108 no matter the forum, because 
of the different approaches for dealing with the issue, employers 
have room to advocate for some laws instead of others.  
Federal law can address the issue either be applying existing 
law to victims of domestic violence or with new legislation.  The 
first solution—to apply or amend existing federal employment 
protection laws so that they cover victims of domestic 
violence—is inadequate.  Over the last several years,  scholars 
and commentators have theorized how existing federal law such 
as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 109 the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 110 and the Family 
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)111 can be interpreted or amended 
to provide protections for domestic violence.112 Scholars have 
generally concluded that as these laws are currently drafted, they 
are incapable of addressing the myriad of issues presented by 
domestic violence in the workplace.113 
                                                        
107 Cf.  Karin, supra note 6, at 379–80, 397–98, 399–400, 428. Karin 
advocates that a “federal law would set a national standard to address a 
national problem.” Id.  at 397.  
108 See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
109 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–
2000e17 (2012). 
110 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 
(2012). 
111 Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 
(2012). 
112 See, e.g.,  Denise R. J. Finlay, Employment Discrimination Against 
Domestic Violence Survivors: Strengthening the Disparate Impact Theory, 88 
N.D.  L.  REV.  989 (2012) (arguing discrimination against victims of domestic 
violence is actionable under disparate treatment theory of Title VII because 
domestic violence is gendered violence); Stone, supra note 20, at 736 (2010) 
(calling for an amendment to FMLA that would trigger the same entitlement 
to leave for an incident of domestic violence as the birth or adoption of a 
child). 
113 See, e.g. ,  Goldscheid, supra note 30, at 123 (arguing that even when 
Title VII is seen as protecting victims of domestic violence from gender-
stereotype based discrimination, Title VII as it has been interpreted is 
incapable of protecting against subtle forms of gender bias which drive many 
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A survey of case law shows that when courts attempt to 
apply existing federal law to the issues presented by domestic 
violence,  those laws are inadequate.  For example,  in O’Donnell 
v. Gonzales, 114 the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts 
permitted an employee of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to 
survive summary judgment on an ADA claim that alleged the 
employer’s failure to accommodate the victim’s Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) and depression. 115 Plaintiff-employee 
had produced documentation both of her status as a victim of 
domestic violence and her diagnosis of PTSD and depression.116 
Her abuser was a coworker and ex-paramour.117 When the 
Bureau found out about the violence, management assigned the 
victim-employee to a 6:00 AM-to-2:30 PM shift and the abuser-
employee to a 4:00 PM-to-midnight shift.118 Considering this 
insufficient,  and after an incident where her abuser spray-painted 
threats and derogatory statements outside of plaintiff’s work 
area, 119 plaintiff requested accommodation for her depression and 
PTSD in the form of either an unspecified period of leave or the 
removal of her ex-paramour from the work force. 120 The court 
held that an unspecified period of leave was unreasonable, but 
that plaintiff had established a question of material fact as to 
whether,  under the ADA, it was reasonable for one employee to 
request the removal of another employee.121 
The O’Donnell case provides an example of how 
incompatible the ADA may be with issues of domestic violence. 
Without a statute that expressly limits a court’s discretion of 
what constitutes a reasonable accommodation in the particular 
context of domestic violence, employers could be found liable 
                                                        
of the adverse employment actions taken against victim-employees).  
114 O’Donnell v. Gonzales, Civil Action No. 04-40190-FDS, 2007 WL 
1101160 (D. Mass. Apr. 2, 2007).  
115 Id.  at *11.  
116 Id.  at *2.  
117 Id.  at *1. 
118 Id.  at *2.  
119 O’Donnell,  2007 WL 1101160 at *4.  
120 Id.  at *8.  
121 Id.  at *8, *10–11. 
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under the ADA for failure to drastically reorganize their 
workforce.122 A reasonable accommodation statute better serves 
employers when it is drafted to clearly outline what employers 
are required to do to reasonably accommodate victims of 
domestic violence.  
More recently,  the agencies that enforce federal employment 
statutes—the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”)123 and the United States Department of Labor (“U.S. 
DOL”)124—have issued specific guidance for when existing 
federal laws may trigger employer liability. 125 Neither of these 
agency Fact Sheets creates new law or extends existing equal 
employment law; instead, they discuss the application of existing 
doctrine to fact patterns that include victims of domestic 
violence. 126   
On November 1, 2012, the EEOC issued a Fact Sheet 
describing certain employer actions that could incur liability 
under Title VII and/or the ADA.127 The EEOC cautions against 
actions such as termination of a woman because of the “drama 
[she may] bring to the workplace” or rejection of a qualified 
                                                        
122 Cf.  CAL.  LAB.  CODE § 230(f)(2) (West 2014) (requiring state 
employers to provide reasonable accommodation of victim-employees). As 
discussed below this statute constrains judicial discretion by providing a list 
of examples of reasonable accommodations. See infra note 264–88 and 
accompanying text.   
123 The federal agency that enforces both the ADA and Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
124 The federal agency that enforces FMLA.  
125 U.S.  EQUAL EMP’T OPPORT’Y COMM’N,  CCH-EPGD P 5354, 
Questions and Answers: The Application of Title VII and the ADA to 
Applicants or Employees Who Experience Domestic or Dating Violence, 
Sexual Assault, or Stalking (2012), 2013 WL 45267 [hereinafter EEOC Fact 
Sheet]; DEP’T OF LABOR,  Frequently Asked Questions about the Revisions to 
the Family and Medical Leave Act, available at http://www.dol.gov/ 
whd/fmla/finalrule/NonMilitaryFAQs.pdf [hereinafter DOL FAQ].  
126 Mary Swanton, EEOC Warns Employers of Discrimination Related to 
Domestic Violence,  INSIDE COUNSEL (Jan. 2013), available at 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/12/21/eeoc-warns-employers-of-
discrimination-related-to. See also DOL FAQ, supra note 125.  
127 EEOC Fact Sheet, supra note 125.    
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male applicant who, as a victim, is viewed as weak. 128 The Fact 
Sheet next provides examples of how workplace sexual 
harassment of and sexual violence against victims of domestic 
violence could incur employer liability under Title VII. 129 The 
Fact Sheet also describes how certain employer actions can 
violate the ADA, such as passing over an applicant after 
learning of her counseling because of prior violence, or failing 
to intervene when coworkers tease an employee on account of 
his violence-related scars. 130 Finally,  the Fact Sheet describes 
how failure to provide reasonable accommodation to a victim-
employee may incur liability under the ADA. Examples include 
when an employee “requests a schedule change or unpaid leave” 
on account of depression resulting from former violence.131 
However,  the Fact Sheet fails to address whether courts may, as 
the O’Donnell court did,  consider the scope of reasonable 
accommodation and find fault with companies who fail to 
provide large-scale accommodations,  such as staff 
reorganization. As it is written, the EEOC Fact Sheet provides 
only factual instances that may give rise to a claim, but it avoids 
the more difficult question of what constitutes the reasonable 
accommodation of victim-employees. 
The U.S. DOL has issued similar guidance for when and 
how the FMLA can be used by victims of domestic violence in 
limited factual scenarios. 132 This guidance states,  “FMLA leave 
may be available to address certain health-related issues resulting 
from domestic violence.” 133 However, only “serious health 
                                                        
128 Id. at *1–2.  
129 Id. at *2. This application comes as no surprise, as Title VII has long 
been held to prohibit sexual harassment of and sexual violence against any 
employees.  See, e.g. ,  Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 
(1986). 
130 EEOC Fact Sheet, supra note 125, at *2.  
131 Id.   The O’Donnell v. Gonzales case provides an example of how this 
could trigger employer liability. See O’Donnell v. Gonzales, Civil Action 
No. 04-40190-FDS, 2007 WL 1101160 (D. Mass. Apr. 2, 2007).  
132 See DOL FAQ, supra note 125, at 10.  
133 Id.  Just as with the EEOC fact sheet, this provides examples of 
applicability in the context of victim-employees: “[A]n eligible employee may 
be able to take FMLA leave if he or she is hospitalized overnight or is 
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conditions” are likely to trigger entitlement to leave, 134 and thus 
the FMLA only has a limited applicability to the issues raised by 
domestic violence. 135 Domestic violence affects employers in 
direct and indirect ways, and FMLA’s application to domestic 
violence will likely cover only the most egregious examples of 
direct effects. 136 It is unlikely that even “broken wrist[s] or black 
eye[s]” will be covered by the most liberal interpretation of 
FMLA.137 Furthermore, the FMLA cannot be easily read to 
permit leave to separate from or bring criminal actions against 
an abuser. 138 Even at its most broad, the FMLA appears 
incapable of providing leave to attend court hearings or stay at a 
domestic violence shelter. 139 Thus,  the FMLA is incapable of 
providing leave for the employee determined to break the cycle 
of abuse.  Employers looking for a federal solution to the indirect 
effects of domestic violence—like absenteeism and diminished 
productivity—must look beyond the FMLA.  
Review of these Fact Sheets shows two things.  First, 
employers should take note that there appears to be a shift in 
federal policy toward greater protections for victims of domestic 
violence. Second, these Fact Sheets create no new law and 
merely apply existing doctrine to limited factual scenarios.  For 
                                                        
receiving certain treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder that resulted 
from domestic violence.” Id. 
134 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612 (a)(1)(A)–(D) (2009) (listing the reasons for 
leave, with “serious health condition” being the only applicable reason).  
Serious health conditions include only injuries that require hospitalization or 
continuing treatment. Id.  § 2611(11).  
135 See Hobday, supra note 84, at 22 (arguing that “none of the current 
federal employment laws directly applies to [victim-employees]”).  
136 See Stone, supra note 20, at 737 (positing that even “a broken wrist 
or black eye” may not be serious enough to meet the statute’s requirement of 
a serious medical condition).   
137 Id. at 737. 
138 Id.  
139 See,  e.g. ,  Stone, supra note 20, at 736–37 (arguing that, because the 
only way for a victim to trigger a right to leave under FMLA is with a 
serious medical condition, “employees are not entitled to the leave that could 
allow them the time to take the first corrective steps in leaving their abusive 
partner”).  
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years commentators have agreed that the application of existing 
federal laws to domestic violence will fail to address many 
issues caused by domestic violence in the workplace. 140 The Fact 
Sheets issued by the agencies that enforce these statutes confirm 
these concerns because the Fact Sheets provide solutions to only 
a very limited number of factual scenarios.  Instead of allowing 
employers and domestic violence victims to continue to suffer 
under current inadequate federal law, Congress should pass new 
legislation that is more directly targeted toward limiting 
domestic violence’s effect on the workplace. 141   
This legislation could be modeled after one of the current 
statutory approaches that exist at the state level: the leave 
approach, the antidiscrimination approach, and/or the reasonable 
accommodation approach. 142 The remainder of this Note explores 
the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches,  as well as 
specific ways that statutes can be drafted so as to ensure that 
employers’ concerns are being addressed without too great of a 
cost.   
 
III.  THE STATUTORY UNPAID LEAVE APPROACH 
 
A.  The Approach Generally 
 
At the state level there are a variety of leave laws that may 
apply to victim-employees.  By far the most ubiquitous of these 
statutes are “crime leave laws.” 143 These laws, present in thirty-
three states,  require employers to permit leave to victims of 
                                                        
140 See supra notes 107, 113 and accompanying text.  
141 See Widiss, supra note 6, at 672; see also Runge, Employment Needs 
Update,  supra note 21, at 23 (chronicling legislative attempts to craft new 
federal legislation that would apply directly to victims of domestic violence).  
142 This Note explores only these three approaches. For a discussion of 
other approaches, including employer protection orders, unemployment 
benefits for employee-victims, and the common-law exception to the at-will 
doctrine finding that the termination of a victim-employee because of her 
status violates public policy, see generally Karin, supra note 6.  
143 Runge, Employment Needs Update,  supra note 21, at 13, 15.  
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crimes. 144 These laws, which were not enacted to specifically 
protect victims of domestic violence, 145 are imperfect.  Crime 
leave laws only provide victim-employees with leave to attend 
court,146 and therefore cannot be used to secure leave to deal 
with other domestic violence issues such as seeking medical care 
or finally new housing.147  
Currently,  thirteen states148 offer specific protections to 
                                                        
144 These states are Alabama, ALA.  CODE § 15-23-81 (2014), Alaska, 
ALASKA STAT.  § 12.61.017 (2012); Arizona, ARIZ.  REV.  STAT.  ANN.  § 13-
4439 (2012); Arkansas, ARK.  CODE ANN.  § 16-90-1105 (LexisNexis 2014); 
California, CAL.  LAB.  CODE 230.2(b) (West 2014); Colorado, COLO.  REV.  
STAT.  § 24-4.1-303(8) (2014); Connecticut, CONN.  GEN.  STAT.  ANN.  § 54-
85(b) (2012); Delaware, DEL.  CODE ANN.  tit.  11, § 9409 (2014); Florida, 
FLA.  STAT.  § 741.313 (2013); Georgia, GA.  CODE ANN.  § 34-1-3 (2014); 
Hawaii,  HAW.  REV.  STAT.  § 621-10.5 (2014); Iowa,  IOWA CODE § 915.23 
(2012); Maryland, MD.  CODE ANN.  CRIM.  PROC.  § 11-102 (2011); 
Massachusetts,  MASS.  GEN.  LAWS ANN.  ch. 258B, § 3 (2013); Michigan, 
MICH.  COMP.  LAWS § 780.762 (2014); Minnesota, MINN.  STAT.  ANN.  § 
611A.036 (West 2014); Mississippi, MISS.  CODE ANN § 99-43-45 (West 
2012); Missouri,  MO.  REV.  STAT.  § 595.209(1)(14) (West 2012); Montana, 
MONT.  CODE ANN.  § 46-24-205(3) (West 2012); Nevada, NEV.  REV.  STAT.  § 
50.070 (2013); New Hampshire, N.H.  REV.  STAT.  ANN.  § 275:62 (2010); 
New York, N.Y.  PENAL LAW § 215.14 (McKinney 2014); North Dakota, 
N.D.  CENT.  CODE § 27-09.1-17 (2013); Ohio, OHIO REV.  CODE ANN.  § 
2930.18 (LexisNexis 2013); Pennsylvania, 18 PA.  STAT.  ANN.  § 4957 
(2013); Rhode Island, R.I.  GEN.  LAWS § 12-28-13 (2010); South Carolina, 
S.C.  CODE ANN.  § 16-3-1550 (2011); Utah, UTAH CODE § 78B-1-132 (2012); 
Vermont, VT.  STAT.  ANN.  tit.  13, § 5313 (2010); Virginia, VA.  CODE ANN.  
§§ 18.2-465.1 (2014); 40.1-28.7:2 (7)(B) (2014); Washington, WASH.  REV.  
CODE § 49.76.120 (2013); Wisconsin, WIS.  STAT.  ANN.  § 103.87 (West 
2013); and Wyoming, WYO.  STAT.  ANN.  § 1-40-209 (2013).  
145 Runge, Employment Needs Update,  supra note 21, at 13, 15.  
146 See generally LEGAL MOMENTUM STATE LAW GUIDE,  supra note 6.  
147 Runge, Employment Needs Update,  supra note 21, at 15. 
148 These states are California, CAL.  LAB.  CODE § 230.1 (West 2014), 
Colorado, COLO.  REV.  STAT.  § 24-34-402.7 (2013); Connecticut, CONN.  
GEN.  STAT.  ANN.  § 31-51ss(b) (West 2011); Florida, FLA.  STAT.  § 741.313 
(2013); Hawaii,  HAW.  REV.  STAT § 378-72(a) (2014); Illinois, 820 ILL.  
COMP.  STAT. 180/20 (2012); Kansas, KAN.  STAT.  ANN.  § 44-1132(d) (2013); 
Maine, ME.  REV.  STAT.  til.  26 § 850 (2007); New Jersey, N.J.S.A. 34:11C-
1 (2013); New Mexico, N.M.  STAT.  ANN.  § 50-4A-3 (2012); North 
Carolina, N.C.  GEN.  STAT.  § 50B-5.5 (2012); Oregon, OR.  REV.  STAT.  § 
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victims of domestic violence by requiring their employer to 
permit victims to take leave to address economic, social,  and 
psychological problems created by domestic violence 
situations. 149 The unpaid leave statutes vary in their applicability 
to employers and employees.150 Some statutes apply,  by their 
terms, to any conceivable employer. 151 Other statutes limit 
jurisdiction to either a broad group of employers152 or only 
larger employers.153 Some statutes limit their applicability to 
employees who have been employed for a certain amount of 
time, though the majority of statutes include most employees 
within the jurisdiction of their leave laws. 154 Other statutes 
include no jurisdictional hooks,  and therefore appear to apply to 
every employer-employee relationship.155  
                                                        
659A.272 (2014); and Washington, WASH.  REV.  CODE § 49.76.030 (2013).  
149 See generally LEGAL MOMENTUM STATE LAW GUIDE,  supra note 6.  
150 See generally id. 
151 See, e.g. ,  N.M.  STAT.  ANN.  § 50-4A-2(D) (2012) (“‘Employer’ 
includes a person, a firm, a partnership, an association, a corporation, a 
receiver or an officer of the court of New Mexico, a state agency, or a unit 
of local government or a school district.”).  
152 See, e.g. ,  CONN.  GEN.  STAT.  ANN.  § 31-51ss (a)(1) (2011) 
(“‘Employer’ means a person engaged in business who has three or more 
employees, including the state and any political subdivision of the state.”); 
OR.  REV.  STAT.  § 659A.270(1) (2014) (covering employers who “employ[] 
six or more individuals).  
153 See, e.g. ,  COLO.  REV.  STAT.  § 24-34-402.7(b) (2013) (applying only 
to employers of 50 or more); FLA.  STAT.  § 741.313(3) (2013) (“This section 
applies to an employer who employs 50 or more employees.”).  
154 See, e.g. ,  COLO.  REV.  STAT.  §§ 24-34-402.7(b) (2013) (applying only 
to “employees who have been employed with the employer for twelve months 
or more); FLA.  STAT.  § 741.313(3) (2013) (“This section applies to .  .  .  an 
employee who has been employed by the employer for 3 or more months.”). 
Compare those against CONN.  GEN.  STAT.  ANN.  § 31-51ss(a)(2) (2011) and 
N.M.  STAT.  ANN.  § 50-4A-2(C) (2012) each defining “employee” to mean a 
person who is employed by or engaged in the service of the employer. See 
also OR.  REV.  STAT.  ANN.  § 659A.270(2) (2011) as amended by 2013 
Oregon Laws Ch. 321 (H.B. 2903) (originally requiring the employee work 
“in excess of twenty-five hours for at least 180 days,” and now applying to 
any employee who is a victim).   
155 See, e.g.,  KAN.  STAT.  ANN.  §§ 44-1131–32 (2013); ME.  REV.  STAT. 
tit. 26 § 850 (2007); N.C.  GEN.  STAT.  § 50B-5.5 (2012). 
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Unpaid leave statutes also vary greatly with regard to the 
maximum amount of time an employer must grant a victim-
employee. Some statutes require employers to only grant three 
days, 156 while others require close to two weeks.157 Maine, North 
Carolina,  Oregon, and Washington do not place a specific cap 
on the amount of unpaid leave they require an employer to 
permit but rather require the employer to grant a “reasonable 
amount of time.”158 Kansas,  on the other hand, sets neither a 
numerical nor a reasonable cap on the amount of leave an 
employee may take. 159  
 
B.  Potential Concerns with the Approach and Possible 
Solutions 
 
The statutory leave approach presents several potential 
problems for employers but there are rejoinders to each of these 
                                                        
156 See, e.g. ,  COLO.  REV.  STAT.  §§ 24-34-402.7(a) (2013) (requiring 
employers to permit up to three days of leave); FLA.  STAT.  § 741.313(3) 
(2013) (requiring “up to 3 working days of leave from work in any 12-month 
period”).  
157 See, e.g. ,  CONN.  GEN.  STAT.  ANN.  § 31-51ss(b) (2011) (permitting 
“employer to “limit unpaid leave . .  .  to twelve days during any calendar 
year”); N.M.  STAT.  ANN.  § 50-4A-2(B) (2012) (requiring leave “up to eight 
hours in one day” for “up to fourteen days in any calendar year”).   
158 See ME.  REV.  STAT.  tit.  26 § 850(1) (2007) (requiring “reasonable 
and necessary leave from work”); N.C.  GEN.  STAT.  § 50B-5.5 (2012) 
(prohibiting discrimination against an employee who “took reasonable time 
off from work”);  OR.  REV.  STAT.  § 659A.272 (2014) (“a covered employer 
shall allow an eligible employee to take reasonable leave” for enumerated 
reasons); WASH.  REV.  CODE § 49.76.030 (2013) (requiring “reasonable leave 
from work, intermittent leave, or leave on a reduced leave schedule”); see 
also GUAM CODE ANN.  22-3-3401–3405 (2013) (requiring a reasonable 
amount of time). The benefits of this approach are discussed in the next 
section.  
159 See KAN.  STAT.  ANN.  § 44-1132 (2013) (“An employer may not 
discharge or in any manner discriminate or retaliate against an employee who 
is a victim of domestic violence or a victim of sexual assault for taking time 
off from work to [list of permissible reasons].”).  The lack of statutory clarity 
in how much time is required begs the question of what an employer would 
be required to provide. 
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problems.  
The most intuitive concern is that employees will abuse the 
law and take leave for unrelated reasons. 160 Some statutes have 
effectively addressed this concern with two inter-connected 
provisions.  The first permits leave only for a finite list of tasks 
such as: obtaining relief from the legal system, 161 seeking 
medical attention related to injuries,162 seeking services from a 
victims’ services organization, 163 seeking new or safer housing,164 
and receiving counseling. 165 The list is essentially the same in 
                                                        
160 See Robin R. Runge, Redefining Leave from Work,  19 GEO.  J.  ON 
POVERTY L.  & POL’Y 445, 480 (2012) (“One of the primary complaints of 
employers in opposition to the FMLA was the cost of hiring, training, and 
maintaining staff to ensure that the reasons that employees were requesting to 
take FMLA leave were permitted under the statute.”);  see also Haase, supra 
note 55, at 351 (describing how the “argument is unrealistic in the case of 
unpaid leave” (emphasis added)).  
161 See,  e.g. ,  FLA.  STAT.  § 741.313(2)(b)(5) (2013) (permitting leave to 
“seek legal assistance in addressing issues arising from the act of domestic 
violence”); KAN.  STAT.  ANN.  § 44-1132(a)(4) (2013) (permitting leave to 
“make court appearances in the aftermath of domestic violence”); N.M.  
STAT.  ANN.  § 50-4A-2(B) (2012) (permitting leave “to obtain an order of 
protection or other judicial relief .  .  . or to meet with law enforcement 
officials, to consult with attorneys or district attorneys’ victim advocates or to 
attend court proceedings”).  
162 See, e.g.,  COLO.  REV.  STAT. § 24-34-402.7(1)(a)(II) (2013) 
(permitting employee to “[o]btain[] medical care or mental health counseling 
.  .  . to address physical or psychological injuries.”); OR.  REV.  STAT.  
§659A.272(2) (2014) (permitting employee to “seek medical treatment for or 
to recover from injuries”).  
163 See, e.g. ,  820 ILL.  COMP.  STAT.  180/20(a)(1)(B) (2012) (permitting 
leave to “obtain[] services from a victim services organization”); ME.  REV.  
STAT.  tit.  26 § 850(1)(C) (2007) (permitting leave to obtain necessary 
services to remedy a crisis caused by domestic violence).  
164 See, e.g.,  COLO.  REV.  STAT.  § 24-34-402.7(1)(a)(III) (2013) 
(permitting the employee leave to either seek new housing or “mak[e] his or 
her home secure from the perpetrator”); 820 ILL.  COMP.  STAT.  
180/20(a)(1)(D) (2012) (permitting “participating in safety planning, 
temporarily or permanently relocating, or taking other actions to increase .  . .  
safety”); OR.  REV.  STAT.  §659A.272(3) (2014) (permitting leave “to relocate 
or take steps to secure an existing home”).  
165 See, e.g. ,  COLO.  REV.  STAT.  § 24-34-402.7(1)(a)(II) (2013); CONN.  
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each law that enumerates permissible reasons. 166 The second 
provision requires the employee to provide certification that the 
leave was for a permissible reason. 167 Where an employee 
attempts to abuse statutory leave laws, the employer will likely 
not be prohibited from disciplinary action. 168 As long as a statute 
only grants leave for an enumerated list of tasks and requires the 
employee to prove that the leave was correctly used, employers 
should not expect extensive employee dishonesty.  
Another concern that employers have with the leave 
approach is that it forces employers to lose productive hours 
from their employees.169 But scholar David Haase correctly 
points out that, for family and medical leave, in the long run the 
opposite may actually be true.170 When no leave requirement is 
in place,  managers make decisions regarding leave requests 
                                                        
GEN.  STAT.  ANN.  § 31-51ss(b)(1) (2011); HAW.  REV.  STAT.  § 378-72(a)(3) 
(2014); 820 ILL.  COMP.  STAT.  180/20(a)(1)(C) (2012); OR.  REV.  STAT. § 
659A.272(3) (2014).  
166 See, e.g. ,  CAL.  LAB.  CODE §§ 230.1(a)(1)–(4) (West 2014); COLO.  
REV.  STAT.  §§ 24-34-402.7(1)(a)(I)–(IV) (2013); CONN.  GEN.  STAT.  ANN.  §§ 
31-51ss(b)(1)–(4) (2011); FLA.  STAT.  §§ 741.313(2)(b)(1)–(5) (2013); HAW.  
REV.  STAT.  §§ 378-72(a)(1)–(5) (2014); KAN.  STAT.  ANN.  §§ 44-1132(a)(1)–
(4) (2013); ME.  REV.  STAT.  til. 26 §§ 850(1)(A)–(C) (2007).  
167 See, e.g. ,  CAL.  LAB.  CODE § 230.1(b) (West 2014) (permitting 
employers to require notice before leave, or upon employee’s return, a police 
report,  court order, or certification by medical, legal, or rights organization 
professional, that tends to show that advanced notice was not feasible); HAW.  
REV.  STAT.  §§ 378-72(b)–(d) (2014) (permitting employers to require 
certification from a medical care professional, attorney, or employee of 
victims’ rights organization).  
168 For example, in Sustatia v. Shannon,  966 N.E.2d 365 (Ill.  App. Ct. 
2012), the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Second District held that an 
employer could terminate a victim-employee after she was unable to provide 
documentation that her leave was for one of the statutorily enumerated 
reasons. It is important to note that the court reached this holding even in the 
face of arguably vague statutory language. Id.  at 371. 
169 A similar criticism was made against the FMLA. Haase, supra note 
55, at 349 (noting that “it may not make economic sense for an employer to 
make sacrifices for employees”).  
170 Id.  
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based on short-term disruptions of work.171 However,  when a 
leave requirement is in place the potential for shortsighted 
management decisions is taken off the table,  and employees are 
granted leave for important life events,  increasing their loyalty 
and productivity over time.172 This argument is particularly 
salient when discussing domestic violence. As discussed earlier,  
domestic violence causes loss of productivity in victim-
employees who are absent from or stalked at work. 173 The ability 
to take leave permits victim-employees to secure economic 
independence from their abusers, 174 and therefore increases their 
long-term productivity and full potential over time. 175 Further, 
leave laws can be drafted so as to require victim-employees to 
provide advanced notice176 so that the employer can adjust 
resources.  Thus, there are several ways that leave laws can be 
drafted so as to alleviate employers concern about lost 
productive hours.   
Another concern is that in order to comply with unpaid leave 
statutes,  employers must expend additional administrative 
                                                        
171 Id.   
172 Id.  
173 See supra Part I.A.  
174 See supra Part I.A.  
175 See Reynolds v. Fraser, 781 N.Y.S.2d 885, 889 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2004) (“The ability to hold on to a job is one of a victim’s most valuable 
weapons in the war for survival, since gainful employment is the key.”).  
176 See, e.g. ,  COLO.  REV.  STAT.  § 24-34-402.7(2)(a) (2013) (permitting 
employers to condition leave on “the appropriate advance notice of such leave 
as may be required by the employer’s policy”). Some statutes waive the 
notice requirement when leave is not foreseeable. See, e.g. ,  OR.  REV.  STAT.  
§ 659A.280 (2014). Colorado and Florida will not allow employers to require 
notice “in cases of imminent danger to the health or safety of the employee.” 
COLO.  REV.  STAT.  § 24-34-402.7(2)(a) (2013); FLA.  STAT.  § 741.313(4)(a) 
(2013). An even more refined solution to the issue can be found in the newly 
enacted California Labor Code. See CAL.  LAB.  CODE § 230.1 (West 2014). 
California requires advance notice, see id.  § 230.1(b)(1), unless advance 
notice is not feasible at which point the employer may subsequently require 
certification that the unscheduled leave was appropriate, see id.  § 
230.1(b)(2).  This certification can be in the form of a (1) police report,  (2) a 
court order, or (3) documentation from a medical professional. See id.  §§ 
230.1(b)(2); 230(b)(2)(A)–(C).  
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resources to keep more thorough records in order to document: 
which employees are victims, how many days those employees 
have taken, and what the leave was used for. 177 There are two 
rejoinders to this concern of administrative costs.  First,  
empirical evidence suggests that the costs of administrating leave 
laws are minimal.178 In 1991, when President George H.W. 
Bush first vetoed the FMLA based, in part,  on his concern over 
increased administration costs, 179 critics correctly countered that 
the concern was not compelling because in states that had 
already enacted family leave requirements,  only six percent of 
employers reported an increase in administrative costs and only 
four percent reported an increase in training and compliance 
costs. 180 Consider,  too,  that in terms of a leave law for victim-
employees,  the administration costs would likely be less because 
the FMLA requires employers to provide up to twelve weeks of 
leave, 181 whereas most leave laws for domestic violence only 
require between three and fourteen days. 182 It is even possible 
that the additional administrative costs may be nil,  because 
                                                        
177  See Haase, supra note 55, at 348 (describing employer’s similar 
concern with the passage of the FMLA). In fact, employers’ concerns about 
the costs that they would incur as the result of a leave requirement prompted 
President Bush to veto the Family and Medical Act of 1990.  Maria L. 
Ontiveros, The Myths of Market Forces, Mothers and Private Employment: 
The Parental Leave Veto,  1 CORNELL J.L.  & PUB.  POL’Y 25, 25 (1992). 
Nevertheless, the law was passed in 1993 over these objections. 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 2601–2654 (1993).  
178 See Ontiveros, supra note 177, at 31.  
179 Id.  at 25. 
180 Id.  at 31 n.27. 
181 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2012). Note, this provision has been held 
unconstitutional when used in a civil suit against a state employer for 
monetary damages when the state has not consented to such a suit.  See 
Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012).  
182 See, e.g. ,  COLO.  REV.  STAT.  §§ 24-34-402.7(1)(a) (2013) (requiring 
employers to permit up to three days of leave); CONN.  GEN.  STAT.  ANN.  § 
31-51ss(b) (2011) (permitting “employer to “limit unpaid leave . .  .  to twelve 
days during any calendar year”); FLA.  STAT.  § 741.313(2)(a) (2013) 
(requiring “up to 3 working days of leave from work in any 12-month 
period”); N.M.  STAT.  ANN.  § 50-4A-2(B) (2012) (requiring leave “up to 
eight hours in one day” for “up to fourteen days in any calendar year”).   
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employers are already required to keep records of leave under 
the FMLA,183 and therefore already have a system for 
documenting leave.  
The second rejoinder to administrative costs is that these 
laws can be drafted in a way that permits employers to require 
certification that the employee is a victim and documentation 
that the leave was for a statutorily defined reason, 184 as well as 
to require the employee to provide advance notice of the 
leave. 185 These notice requirements should defer some 
administrative costs by shifting the record-keeping requirements 
onto the victim-employee, and thus deal with employer 
concerns.   
Another concern is that smaller employers will be 
disproportionately affected by statutory leave requirements. 186 
Exempting smaller employers from the leave requirement will 
solve this issue. The FMLA, for example,  exempts employers 
who employ less than fifty employees. 187 Many of the states that 
have adopted statutory leave laws have similarly limited their 
applicability to larger employers,188 on the basis that these 
resource-rich employers are more capable of assuming the cost 
of granting leave. 189 Other states take a different approach and 
require employers of different sizes to grant different periods of 
                                                        
183 Haase, supra note 55, at 348.  
184 See,  e.g.,  Sustatia v. Shannon, 966 N.E.2d 365, 371–72 (Ill.  App. 
Ct. 2012) (holding that Illinois leave law permitted the employee to certify 
that she was a victim as well as require her to provide documentation that she 
used leave for one of the statutorily enumerated reasons). 
185 See supra note 176 and accompanying text (describing notice 
requirements). California’s approach appears most tailored to the emergent 
nature of domestic violence and employers’ interests in notice and record 
keeping). See CAL.  LAB.  CODE §§ 230(d)(2)(A)–(C) (West 2014). 
186 See Hilary Mattis, Comment, California’s Survivors of Domestic 
Violence Employment Leave Act: The Twenty-Five Employee Minimum Is Not 
A Good Rule of Thumb,  50 SANTA CLARA L.  REV.  1319, 1338 (2010). 
187 The FMLA applies only to employers who employ more than fifty 
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (2012).  
188 See supra Part III.A.  
189 See Widiss, supra note 6, at 700–05.   
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leave. 190 It should also be noted that the “cost” imposed by 
domestic violence leave laws is almost always less than the 
twelve-week “cost” imposed by the FMLA. 191 As such, it may 
not be as important for resource-poor,  smaller businesses to 
advocate for the small-employer exception, as it was when 
employers raised the argument against the more “costly” 
FMLA.192 Regardless,  statutory leave laws prove amenable to 
the concern of disproportionate impact by either exempting 
smaller employers or by scaling required leave to employer size.   
Some states have adopted a statutory leave statute that 
requires employers to grant a reasonable period of leave instead 
of a statutorily defined period. This hybrid approach was 
adopted by Hawaii,  Oregon, and Maine.193 The reasonable leave 
approach presents an alternative solution to the cost-bearing 
problem. Oregon, for example,  requires covered employers to 
grant “reasonable leave” 194 but also permits employers to “limit 
the amount of leave if such leave creates an undue hardship on 
the employer’s business.”195 As such, Oregon permits an 
                                                        
190 See, e.g. ,  HAW.  REV.  STAT.  § 378-72(a) (2014) (requiring employers 
of fifty or more to grant up to thirty days and smaller employers to grant up 
to five). The problem with this approach is that it seems arbitrary that one 
employee would create such a difference in requirements. The “reasonable 
leave” approach, described shortly, may provide a similar, but less arbitrary 
approach.  
191 Only Illinois requires up to 12 weeks of leave. 820 ILL.  COMP.  STAT. 
180/20(a)(2) (2009). As discussed most states require between three days and 
two weeks. It should be noted that the New York Senate and Assembly are 
considering companion bills that would require employers to provide up to 90 
days of leave to victims. See Nurse, supra note 17; see also A. 7029, 2013 
N.Y. Assemb. (Apr. 30, 2013); S. 2509, 2013 N.Y. Senate. (Apr. 15, 
2013).  
192 Mattis, supra note 186, at 1338. Indeed, this is another example of 
how path dependence may be guiding employers’ opposition to employment 
protections for domestic violence even where there are distinct differences 
between these laws and their predecessors.  
193 HAW.  REV.  STAT.  § 378-72(b) (2014); ME.  REV.  STAT.  tit.  26 § 
850(2)(A) (2007); OR.  REV.  STAT.  § 659A.272 (2014).  
194 OR.  REV.  STAT.  § 659A.272 (2014). 
195 Id.  § 695A275(1). See also ME.  REV.  STAT.  tit.  26 § 850(2)(A) 
(2007) (providing a similar limit).   
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employer’s size to factor into how much leave it is required to 
provide.196 Hawaii resolves the proof of reasonableness issue by 
requiring the employee to submit a statement by a professional 
that certifies the need for and reasonableness of the requested 
time. 197  
In sum, the statutory leave approach has proven amenable to 
employers’ cost-bearing concerns first because often the leave 
laws are paired with an exemption for smaller resource-poor 
businesses.  Second, by requiring the employee to provide 
documentation that the leave was taken for an enumerated 
reason, a leave statute can ensure that the employer is only 
providing leave for employees who are attempting to resolve the 
issue of domestic violence in her life.  Third, while a leave 
statute would certainly require the employer to assume the cost 
of providing leave, the potential long-term gain of permitting 
leave—allowing the employee to become independent from her 
abuser and thus more productive—greatly overshadows the 
short-term costs.  Furthermore, as is the case in Oregon, statutes 
can provide that an employer is only required to provide 
reasonable leave that does not present an undue burden. The 
reasonable leave approach ensures that the short-term costs of 
leave are less than the long-term benefits.  Thus, employers 
should consider supporting a federal leave requirement.  
Provided that a leave requirement statute is drafted as described 
above, a leave requirement would benefit employers without 
imposing excessive costs.    
 
                                                        
196 In fact, the Oregon leave law is a hybrid of the statutory leave 
approach and the reasonable accommodation approach and includes all the 
cost-detriment balancing benefits associated with the reasonable 
accommodation approach described infra Part V.  
197 See HAW.  REV.  STAT.  § 378-72(b) (2014) (“‘Reasonable period of 
time’ .  .  .  means: (1) Where due to physical or psychological injury .  .  .  the 
period of time determined to be necessary by the attending health care 
provider .  .  .  ; and (2) Where due to an employee’s need to take legal or 
other actions .  .  .  the period of time. . .  [determined necessary] by the 
employee’s or employee’s minor child’s attorney . . .  .”); id.  (c)–(d) 
(permitting employer to require certified documentation from the involved 
medical professional).   
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IV.  THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION APPROACH   
 
A.  The Approach Generally 
 
The antidiscrimination approach essentially treats victim of 
domestic violence as a status,  and prohibits employers from 
discriminating against victim-employees in a term or condition 
of their employment.  198 Only five states,  California, 199 Hawaii,200 
Illinois,201 New York, 202 and Oregon, 203 have adopted the 
antidiscrimination approach. The Illinois Victims’ Economic 
Security and Safety Act (“VESSA”) provides a detailed example 
of how the antidiscrimination statutes operate:  
An employer shall not fail to hire,  refuse to hire,  
discharge, constructively discharge, or harass any 
individual,  otherwise discriminate against any 
individual with respect to the compensation, 
terms, conditions,  or privileges of employment of 
the individual,  or retaliate against an individual in 
any form or manner .  . .  because: (1) the 
individual involved: (A) is or is perceived to be a 
victim of domestic or sexual violence .  .  . .204 
However,  antidiscrimination statutes are not well suited to 
addressing the issue of domestic violence.  As a preliminary 
matter,  it is worthwhile to note that New York is the only state 
to have adopted only the antidiscrimination approach; each of 
the other four states (California, Hawaii,  Illinois,  and Oregon) 
                                                        
198 See, e.g. ,  N.Y.  EXEC.  LAW § 296 (McKinney 2010) (“It shall be an 
unlawful discriminatory practice: (a) [f]or an employer . .  .  because of an 
individual’s .  . .  domestic violence victim status, to refuse to hire or employ 
or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate 
against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges 
of employment.”).   
199 CAL.  LAB.  CODE §§ 230.1(a)–(e) (West 2014). 
200 HAW.  REV.  STAT.  § 378-2(a) (2014). 
201 820 ILL.  COMP.  STAT.  180/30 (2012).  
202 N.Y.  EXEC.  LAW § 296 (McKinney 2010). 
203 OR.  REV.  STAT.  ANN.  §§ 659A.290, 659A.885 (2014). 
204 820 ILL.  COMP.  STAT.  180/30(a) (2012). 
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buttress their antidiscrimination statute with either a leave 
requirement or an accommodation statute.205 
 
B.  Problems with the Antidiscrimination Approach  
 
The clearest problem with the antidiscrimination approach is 
that unlike other protected categories,  like race or gender,  the 
status at issue (being a victim of domestic violence) “is a 
descriptive statement regarding a certain kind of criminal or 
controlling behavior to which an individual has been 
subjected.”206 Having the status of a domestic violence victim is 
very different than having a status associated with an immutable 
characteristic such as Native American, woman, Latino, etc. 
Normally the antidiscrimination approach seeks to prevent 
employers from allowing certain immutable classifications to 
determine employment outcomes, even where disparate 
treatment would be profitable for the employer. 207 Unlike other 
protected classifications,  which are immutable,  the status of 
“victim” is mutable.  A victim-employee is capable of attaining 
financial and personal independence from her abuser. 208 Indeed, 
encouraging an employee to become economically independent 
                                                        
205 In fact, California, Hawaii, and Illinois have statues that use all three 
approaches. See CAL.  LAB.  CODE §§ 230, 230.1 (West 2014); HAW.  REV.  
STAT.  § 378-2 (2014); 820 ILL.  COMP.  STAT. 180 (2012). Oregon has a 
reasonable leave requirement in addition to its antidiscrimination statute.  OR.  
REV.  STAT.  ANN.  §§ 659A.290, 659A.885 (2014). See also supra notes 17–
19 and accompanying text for a discussion of how New York is considering 
buttressing its antidiscrimination statute with more functional statutes.  
206 Widiss, supra note 6, at 706–07 (referring to the approach as a 
“strange fit”). 
207 J.H. Verkerke, Disaggregating Antidiscrimination and 
Accommodation, 44 WM.  & MARY L.  REV.  1385, 1406 (2003).  
208 Widiss, supra note 6, at 707. In fact, the goal of employment 
protections is to provide the victim-employee with an opportunity to break the 
cycle of violence and undo the classification. See, e.g. ,  WASH.  REV.  CODE § 
49.76.010 (2013) (stating, in the legislative findings of the Washington 
domestic leave law, “[o]ne of the best predictors of whether a victim of 
domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking will be able to stay away from 
an abuser is his or her degree of economic independence”).  
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should be employers’ ultimate goal in advocating for these 
statutes.  Thus, it is contrary to employer interests to advocate 
for a statute that is tied to status.   
An interconnected problem with the antidiscrimination 
approach is that it is only triggered by an employer’s intentional 
act of discrimination motivated by animus. 209 A criticism against 
this narrow focus,  raised by employee advocates,  is that it 
allows “savvy employers” to avoid liability as long as they dress 
their policies in a facially neutral manner. 210 Often, therefore, 
employers support this approach because it,  as compared to 
other approaches,  bears them little to no cost. 211 In the case of 
domestic violence, however,  this “no cost”  leads to “no gain.”  
Recall two earlier discussions: first,  domestic violence reduces 
employee productivity and thus increases costs; and second,  
employers should support a legal protection because it will 
externalize the cost of internally assisting the victim in ending 
the cycle of violence. The antidiscrimination approach is not in 
line with employers’ long-term interests because it does not 
require affirmative action and merely prohibits discriminatory 
                                                        
209 Goldscheid, supra note 30, at 67. Usually this argument is raised in a 
discussion of the antidiscrimination approach’s inability to deal with 
subconscious and implicit bias against immutable characteristics such as race 
or gender. See, e.g. ,  id.   
210 Anastasia Niedrich, Removing Categorical Constraints on Equal 
Employment Opportunities and Antidiscrimination Protections,  18 MICH.  J.  
GENDER & L.  25, 52 (2011) (“So long as employers promulgate and enforce 
policies that ‘appear credible and lacking in animus,’ then courts are usually 
‘reluctant to second-guess’ them.” (quoting Marc Rosenblum, The 
Prerogative to Downsize—A Commentary on Blumrosen, et.  al. ,  2 EMP.  RTS.  
& EMP.  POL’Y J.  417, 436 (1998))).  
211 Widiss, supra note 6, at 696. Consider also that under the current 
standards of proof articulated by the Supreme Court’s decision in St. Mary’s 
Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1997), an employer may dodge 
liability for discrimination, even when a former or current employee presents 
a prima facie case for discrimination, if the employer rebuts “merely by 
offering reasons which, if true, are nondiscriminatory.” Raymond Nardo, 
Evidentiary Issues in Employment Discrimination Litigation,  9 J.  SUFFOLK 
ACAD.  L. 139, 148 (1994).  Of course, even if employers have easier 
standards of proof at trial,  this does not avoid the litigation cost of going to 
trial.  
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acts. 212 Instead, employers should embrace legislation that 
normalizes the cost of affirmatively assisting employees,  which 
can assist those employees in recognizing their full potential, 
rather than supporting legislation tied to classification. 213  
Another criticism of the antidiscrimination approach is that it 
may require employers to illegally infringe on the privacy of 
their workers.214 Unlike many statutory leave laws, which 
require the employee to submit certain documentation, 215 many 
of the antidiscrimination statutes provide no explanation of how 
an employer is supposed to know which of their employees are 
victims. 216 This becomes a problem in states that recognize the 
constructive knowledge theory of discrimination liability. 217 In 
the context of domestic violence, an employer may be liable 
under the constructive knowledge theory if there is an adverse 
employment action (termination, demotion, failure to promote, 
etc.) after signs that should have put the employer on notice that 
                                                        
212 See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination 
with A Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the 
Americans with Disabilities Act?,  79 N.C.  L.  REV.  307 (2001) (taking the 
position that the main difference between reasonable accommodation and 
antidiscrimination is the requirement of positive action). But see Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of 
(Disability) Civil Rights,  89 VA.  L.  REV.  825, 859–70 (2003) (arguing that 
the distinction is illusory).  
213 Professor Deborah Widiss takes this argument even further and notes 
that because the antidiscrimination approach essentially “[e]ncourages 
employers to treat everyone the ‘same’ .  .  .  [it] could have the unintended 
effect of discouraging employers from providing employees who are victims 
of domestic violence with the flexibility they need.” Widiss, supra note 6, at 
707. 
214 See, e.g. ,  California Chamber of Commerce, Letter in Opposition, 
supra note 10.  
215 See supra note 176 and accompanying text (describing notice 
requirements).  
216 Compare, e.g.,  N.Y.  EXEC.  LAW § 296 (McKinney 2014) (lacking 
any form of notice or documentation requirement),  with the notice provisions 
described supra Part III.B.  
217 California Chamber of Commerce, Letter in Opposition, supra note 
10. 
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domestic violence was present in the employee’s life. 218 In other 
words,  under this theory, an employer who should have known 
that an employee suffered from domestic violence and takes an 
adverse employment action against that employee can be found 
just as liable as an employer who intentionally takes the adverse 
employment action because of the victim’s status. 219 Consider 
also that under some states’ labor laws,  an employer may not 
inquire into or discriminate against an employee because of his 
off-duty activities or aspects of his personal life. 220 Essentially 
this means that when an employer suspects that an employee is a 
victim, they have two options: discipline the employee for their 
erratic behavior or attempt to confirm their suspicion to ensure 
that the employee is properly noted as a member of a protected 
classification. 221 The first option will incur liability under a 
constructive knowledge theory and the second will incur liability 
under a privacy law. 222 This dilemma provides further evidence 
that the very nature of domestic violence makes it incompatible 
with an antidiscrimination approach.  
 
V. THE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION APPROACH 
 
A.  The Approach Generally 
 
As of January 2013, only four jurisdictions,  Illinois,223 
                                                        
218 Id.  
219 See id.  The California Chamber of Commerce argues that under 
established case law, “explicit statements regarding discrimination are 
unnecessary if surrounding circumstances are sufficient to place employer on 
notice.” Id.  (citing Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.,  116 P.3d 1123, 1133 
(Cal. 2005)). The constructive knowledge theory of employment 
discrimination is also established in sexual harassment claims.  See, e.g. , 
Splunge v. Shoney’s, Inc.,  97 F.3d 488, 490 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
employers only need constructive notice of sexual harassment).  
220 See, e.g. , N.Y.  LAB.  LAW §§ 201-d(2)(a)–(d) (McKinney 2014).   
221 California Chamber of Commerce, Letter in Opposition, supra note 
10. 
222 Id.   
223 820 ILL.  COMP.  STAT.  180/20 (2012). 
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Hawaii, 224 New York City, 225 and Westchester County,  New 
York,226 had statutes that require employers to reasonably 
accommodate victims of domestic violence. 227 On October 11, 
2013, California became the fifth jurisdiction to adopt the 
approach. 228 Essentially,  reasonable accommodation statutes 
require an employer to alter working conditions to accommodate 
an employee who is a victim of domestic violence, provided that 
the accommodation is reasonable. 229 Hawaii’s Labor Code 
provides an example of how these jurisdictions have crafted 
domestic violence reasonable accommodations statutes. 230 Section 
378-81(a) provides “[a]n employer shall make reasonable 
accommodations in the workplace for an employee who is a 
victim of domestic or sexual violence .  .  .  provided that an 
employer shall not be required to make the reasonable 
accommodations if they cause undue hardship on the work 
operations of the employer.”231 Subsection (b) permits the 
employer to “verify” that the requesting employee is in fact a 
                                                        
224 HAW.  REV.  STAT.  § 378-81(a) (2014). 
225 N.Y.C.  ADMIN.  CODE § 8-107.1(3)(a) (McKinney 2013).  
226 WESTCHESTER CNTY.  CODE § 700.03(a)(8) (2007). 
227 See generally LEGAL MOMENTUM STATE LAW GUIDE,  supra note 6.   
228 See New California Law Protects Stalking Victims from  
Discrimination and Retaliation,  JACKSON LEWIS LLP (Oct. 22, 2013), 
http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID= 4634.  
229 See Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (Judge Richard Posner discussing the reasonable accommodation 
requirement of the ADA).  
230 HAW.  REV.  STAT.  § 378-81 (2014). 
231 Id.  § 378-81(a). Subsection (a) also includes a list of possible 
reasonable accommodations:   
(1) Changing the contact information, such as telephone 
numbers, fax numbers, or electronic-mail addresses, of the 
employee; (2) Screening the telephone calls of the 
employee; (3) Restructuring the job functions of the 
employee; (4) Changing the work location of the employee; 
(5) Installing locks and other security devices; and (6) 
Allowing the employee to work flexible hours.  
Id.  
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victim of domestic violence.232 Subsection (c) defines undue 
hardship as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense 
on the operation of an employer” and lists several factors to be 
considered in the determination of whether a burden is undue.233 
Practically,  the way that the reasonable accommodation statutes 
typically function is thus.  First,  the employee will verify or 
document that he is a victim of domestic violence by presenting 
a restraining order or police incident report. 234 Second, the 
employee will request a reasonable accommodation, such as a 
change in work location or a change in phone number because 
his abuser is harassing him at work.235 Third,  the employer must 
provide that reasonable accommodation unless it would impose 
an undue burden on her business.   
Employers have raised several arguments against the 
reasonable accommodation approach, but in fact,  this approach 
is the most amenable to employers’ interests.    
 
  
                                                        
232 Id.  § 378-81(b).  
233 Id.  § 378-81(c).  The factors to be considered are:  
(1) The nature and cost of the reasonable accommodation 
needed under this section; 
(2) The overall financial resources of the employer; the 
number of employees of the employer; and the number, 
type, and placement of the work locations of an 
employer; and 
(3) The type of operation of the employer, including the 
composition, structure, and functions of the workforce 
of the employer, the geographic separateness of the 
victim’s work location from the employer, and the 
administrative or fiscal relationship of the work location 
to the employer.  
Id.  
234 See supra note 176 (discussing documentation requirements).  
235 See infra notes 251–55, 261 (discussing the process of requesting the 
accommodation).  
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B. Problems with the Approach and Possible Solutions 
 
1. Bearing the Cost of Third-Party Behavior 
 
The greatest concern with a reasonable accommodation 
statute is that it requires the employer to assume costs because 
of the behavior of a third party, the abuser.  However,  this cost-
bearing issue is actually present in any statute that affords 
employment protections for employee-victims. Employer costs 
may seem more salient with a reasonable accommodation statute 
because the employer is required to enact long-term changes to 
their business as opposed to quick periods of leave. 236 In reality, 
the inverse may be true.237 Statutes that require the reasonable 
accommodation of victims of domestic violence may be best 
suited to address employers’ cost-bearing concerns.  This is 
because these statutes can be drafted so as to enumerate specific 
low-cost accommodations,  because these statutes require a 
dialogue between the victim-employee and the employer,  and 
because these statutes are best able to end the violence in the 
victim-employee’s life,  thus returning him or her to full 
productivity. Thus,  a reasonable accommodation statute can be 
drafted so as to trade the short-term costs of unburdensome 
accommodations with the long-term benefit of productivity.   
First,  unlike the other approaches,  the reasonable 
accommodation approach necessarily considers costs imposed on 
employers.  Reasonable accommodation statutes do this by their 
very nature “since ‘reasonableness’ is determined by examining 
the hardship to the employer of providing the 
accommodation.”238 Furthermore, reasonable accommodation 
statutes,  including the ADA provision discussed in O’Donnell,239 
                                                        
236 See Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable 
Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities,  44 WM.  & MARY L.  REV.  1197, 
1253 (2003) (discussing the same issue in the context of the ADA).  
237 Id.  (suggesting the same with regard to the ADA).  
238 Brown, supra note 24, at 34.  
239 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012) (requiring employer to 
provide accommodations “unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship .  .  .  .”);  see also supra 
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often include an “undue hardship” exception which prohibits 
courts and agencies from requiring accommodations that place 
unreasonable or extensive costs on the employer.240 Undue 
hardship provisions thereby function so as to ensure “focus[] on 
the resources and circumstances of the particular employer in 
relationship to the cost or difficulty of providing a specific 
accommodation.”241  
One reasonable accommodation statute,  the Illinois Victims’ 
Economic Security and Safety Act (“VESSA”), for example, 
enumerates several factors that are to be considered in the 
reasonableness/undue burden analysis: (i) “the nature and cost of 
the accommodation” requested; (ii) “the [reasonable 
accommodation’s] effect on expenses and resources,  or the 
impact .  . .  on the operation of the facility;” (iii) “the overall 
financial resources of the employer;” and (iv) “the 
administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility to the 
employ[er] .  . . .”242 A provision such as this may help defer 
some of the fears that reasonable accommodation requirements 
will disparately impact small businesses.  Hawaii,  California,  and 
Westchester County,  New York provide lists of similar factors 
to consider in the determination of whether an accommodation is 
unduly burdensome. 243 California’s recently amended Labor 
                                                        
notes 114–22.  
240 See, e.g. ,  HAW.  REV.  STAT.  § 378-81(a) (2014) (“An employer shall 
make reasonable accommodations in the workplace for an employee who is a 
victim of domestic or sexual violence, including [list of potential 
accommodations] provided that an employer shall not be required to make the 
reasonable accommodations if they cause undue hardship on the work 
operations of the employer.”).  
241 EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,  NO.  915.002,  ENFORCEMENT 
GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER 
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (Oct. 17, 2002), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html.  
242 820 ILL.  COMP.  STAT.  180/30(b)(4)(B)(i)–(iv) (2012). 
243 See HAW.  REV.  STAT.  § 378-81(c) (2014) (requiring consideration of: 
“(1) [t]he nature and cost of the reasonable accommodation needed . .  .  ; (2) 
[t]he overall financial resources of the employer; the number of employees of 
the employer; and the number, type, and placement of the work locations of 
an employer; and (3) [t]he type of operation of the employer, including the 
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Code provides an additional and important guiding provision: 
“an undue hardship also includes an action that would violate an 
employer’s duty to furnish and maintain a place of employment 
that is safe and healthful for all employees .  .  .  .”244 Such a 
provision ensures that employers are not required to grant 
accommodations that would make the workplace unsafe for 
coworkers of victim-employees. 245  
In sum, as evidenced by accommodation statutes in Illinois, 
Hawaii,  California,  and Westchester,  accommodation statutes 
can protect against unreasonably expensive accommodations 
provided that they are clearly drafted. If employers are faced 
with a bill that would require a reasonable accommodation, they 
should advocate for a provision that,  like the corresponding 
provision in VESSA, requires consideration of the size of the 
employer as well as the cost of providing the accommodation. 
Further,  employers should advocate for accommodation statutes,  
like the recently enacted California Labor Code, that clearly 
provide that they are not required to provide accommodations 
that would jeopardize the safety of their workplace.   
Second, short-term accommodation costs are likely to be 
slight.  Even without a statute requiring employers to reasonably 
accommodate employee-victims, many employers have adopted 
internal policies that require management to make certain 
changes in employment policies for victims of domestic 
violence. 246 The main goal of these internal policies has been to 
ensure safety on-site and during travel to work, and include 
                                                        
composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of the employer, the 
geographic separateness of the victim’s work location from the employer, and 
the administrative or fiscal relationship of the work location to the 
employer”); see also CAL.  LABOR CODE § 230(f)(6) (West 2014) (relying on 
the definition provided in CAL.  GOV.  CODE § 12926(u) (2014) and therefore 
accounting for similar considerations.); WESTCHESTER CNTY.  CODE § 
700.03(a)(8) (2007). 
244 CAL.  LABOR CODE § 230(f)(6) (West 2014). 
245 Id.  (exempting any accommodation that would require the employer 
to violate Section 6400 of California’s Labor Code). See also CAL.  LABOR 
CODE § 6400(a) (West 2014) (“Every employer shall furnish employment and 
a place of employment that is safe and healthful for the employees therein.”).  
246 See, e.g. , Randel & Wells, supra note 48, at 829–32.  
2014.05.19 DURBIN.DOCX 5/27/2014  11:30 AM 
 ACCOMMODATING EMPLOYERS’ INTERESTS 893 
“low-to-no cost modifications such as changing phone numbers,  
worksite locations,  shift adjustments,  or application of leave 
policies to domestic or sexual violence related appointments.”247 
Essentially,  the reasonable accommodation approach is a legal 
codification of the policies that many employers intuitively 
adopt. 248  
Furthermore, employers should advocate for a reasonable 
accommodation statute that only requires minimal 
accommodations that are narrowly tailored toward ensuring the 
employee’s safety and economic independence.  This would be 
accomplished by defining reasonable accommodations to include 
a finite list of actions.  For example,  the California’s revised 
labor code now provides: 
[R]easonable accommodations may include the 
implementation of safety measures,  including a 
transfer,  reassignment,  modified schedule, 
changed work telephone, changed work station, 
installed lock, assistance in documenting domestic 
violence, sexual assault,  or stalking that occurs in 
the workplace,  an implemented safety procedure,  
or another adjustment to a job structure,  
workplace facility,  or work requirement in 
response to domestic violence, sexual assault,  or 
stalking,  or referral to a victim assistance 
organization.249  
Employers should advocate that a future federal 
accommodation law would instead read, “Reasonable 
accommodations shall only include .  .  .  [section] 230(f)(2)’s 
enumerated list].” This would ensure that employers are only 
required to assume lost-cost accommodations.   
                                                        
247 Goldscheid, supra note 30, at 120.  
248 See, e.g. ,  Randel & Wells, supra note 48, at 833 (describing Liz 
Claiborne’s policy that “allows for flexible hours and time off for employees 
who need to seek safety and protection, arrange new housing, attend court 
appearances, or take care of other such matters .  .  .  [as well as] provid[es] 
secure work areas, special parking spaces, [and] escorts to and from 
transportation”).  
249 CAL.  LABOR CODE § 230(f)(2) (West 2014) (emphasis added).  
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Third, the reasonable accommodation approach, because it 
requires communication between the victim-employee and his or 
her employer,  is best suited to lessen domestic violence’s effect 
on employee-productivity.  Generally employees are afraid to 
disclose incidents of domestic violence to their superiors.250 
Without legal protection, an employee likely equates disclosure 
with the risk of termination.251 If a reasonable accommodation 
statute requires the employee to request the accommodation and 
provide documentation of their domestic violence, 252 then the 
employee is provided with an incentive to break the silence. 253 
This is important because then there can be a discussion about 
the needs of that particular employee and what steps they can 
take to better their situation.254 For example,  California Labor 
Law section 230 is amended so as to require the employer to 
engage “in a timely, good faith,  and interactive process with the 
employee to determine effective reasonable accommodations.” 255   
The interactive process that is part and parcel to the 
reasonable accommodation approach provides three benefits.  
                                                        
250 Margaret Graham Tebo, When Home Comes to Work Experts Say 
Employers Should Seek A Balanced Approach in Dealing with Workers 
Facing Domestic Violence,  91-A.B.A. J.,  Sept. 2005, at 42, 44.  
251 Stephanie L. Perin, Note, Employers May Have to Pay When 
Domestic Violence Goes to Work,  18 REV.  LITIG.  365, 396 (1999).  
252 It is not unreasonable to predict that employers would be successful if 
they were to advocate for reasonable accommodation statutes to include 
provisions that employees prove with certified documents that they are 
victims of domestic violence. As described supra Part III.B, many of the 
statutory leave approach laws permit employers to condition the granting of 
leave on the employees’ ability to certify their status as a victim of domestic 
violence.  
253 See Goldscheid, supra note 30, at 116–17 (“[A]n employee will be 
more likely to disclose in an environment with a clearly articulated policy 
that explains the employer’s . .  .  support for victims . .  .  .”).  
254 Karin, supra note 6, at 408. 
255 CAL.  LABOR CODE § 230(f)(4) (West 2014). This statutory provision 
appears to have been inspired by the Federal Code of Regulations’ guidance 
for ADA reasonable accommodation requirements. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 
(2012). The federal code provides “it may be necessary for the covered entity 
to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual.” Id.  § 
1630.2(o)(3).  
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First,  if an employer is aware of the possibility of violence in 
the workplace,  they can take proactive steps toward avoiding 
that violence. 256  These steps would likely cost less than dealing 
with an incidence of violence after it has occurred. 257 Second, 
when victim-employees inform their supervisors about their 
situation, the supervisor can refer the victim-employee to 
external services.  The workplace is an “effective vehicle for 
disseminating information about available resources.” 258 A 
qualitative study by Jennifer E. Swanberg and T. K. Logan 
found that once a supervisor is aware of the situation in the 
employee’s life,  they often go out of their way to offer 
support.259 The following quotes from victim-employees in the 
Swanberg and Logan study provide salient examples of how 
managers responded to the information by providing slight 
accommodations and referrals to victim-services: 
Yeah, I told my boss.  She uhm, that was really 
like the first incident and she let me take a couple 
days off from work. She was supportive .  .  . I 
could not have [moved to a shelter] without her. 
.  .  .   
[T]here was another lady in HR, and I’ve talked 
to her and told her.  The woman that I report 
to .  .  .  talked with the county attorneys and 
explained to her what was going on. They have 
me working at another location now and I don’t 
mind going to that location. I told her that I really 
needed to work .  .  .  she mentioned to me that 
                                                        
256 See Jacobs & Raghu, supra note 20, at 604 (“It is in the employer’s 
interest to have as much information as possible about a potentially disruptive 
situation, so that it can take steps to avoid such a situation, instead of having 
to respond to an actual incident.”).  
257 See id.   
258 Hobday, supra note 84, at 21. Consider also that employer-side 
attorneys often advise employers to collaborate with employees in drafting 
solutions. See, e.g. ,  Veena A. Iyer, Commentary, Intimate Partner Violence 
at Work,  27 WESTLAW J.  EMP. ,  no. 18, Apr. 2013, at *1, *7.  
259 Swanberg & Logan, supra note 21, at 12 (“Among all of the women 
who confided in supervisors or managers .  .  .  a strong majority (86%) 
received formal or informal support from the workplace.”).  
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they would set up a laptop [at the shelter] for me 
and a phone .  .  .  I said that I would be willing to 
work in the warehouse or work anywhere just so I 
can work.  And they had me, I have to go to 
[another city] every day and they pay me for the 
driving time. 
.  .  .   
I have a manager .  .  .  .  [S]he’s taking me to a 
seminar on domestic violence .  .  .  .  She helps 
me .  . .  because her daughter’s going through it,  
she can relate. 260 
These examples illustrate that when management learns of 
the employee’s situation,  they can involve external services. 261 
When an employee seeks these external services,  they are more 
likely to end the cycle of abuse and return to their full level of 
productivity.  Therefore,  by opening the lines of communication, 
the reasonable accommodation approach likely hastens the 
resolution of the issue.  Third,  there is a potential benefit to 
workplace morale when the workplace is more open. Swanberg 
and Logan’s study also concluded that employees were more 
focused on their work just knowing that they had their 
supervisors’ support.262 Thus,  the interactive process that is part 
and parcel to the reasonable accommodation approach involves a 
trade of short-term accommodation costs with long-term 
productivity gains.263 
                                                        
260 Id.  at 12–13.  It is also worth noting that the supervisor’s solution in 
most of these examples was to provide the victim-employees with a 
reasonable accommodation. See id.  In the study the managers were under no 
legal requirement to provide victim-employees with accommodation, yet in 
the second example, the manager intuited that the best solution was to change 
the victim-employee’s worksite. Id.  As such, the reasonable accommodation 
approach most closely tracks the intuitive behavior of management.   
261 See id.  at 13.  
262 Id.  at 12–13.  
263 Studies have also shown that in the context of accommodating 
employees with disabilities, employers report “higher productivity,” “greater 
dedication,” “fewer insurance claims,” and “improved corporate culture.” 
Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability 
Accommodations,  53 DUKE L.J. 79, 105 (2003).  
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In sum, while reasonable accommodation statutes do 
unquestionably require employers to assume the costs of third-
party behavior,  these statutes can be drafted to ensure that the 
costs employers bear are no greater than the gains.  This is true 
because the approach necessarily considers the reasonableness of 
an accommodation and the burden it requires,  the statutes can be 
drafted so as to only require a finite list of low-cost 
accommodations.  Further,  there are long-term benefits from an 
interactive process that allows for communication between the 
employer and a victim-employee.  Thus, accommodations can 
require only short-term costs and yield long-term productivity 
gains.   
 
2. Ad Hoc Judicial Determinations 
 
Another potential criticism of the reasonable accommodation 
approach is that a court may later hold that what management 
determines to be an undue burden is in fact a reasonable 
accommodation. 264 This issue of ad hoc judicial determinations is 
a valid concern for any statute with a reasonableness standard, 
especially a statute that seeks to control employer discretion and 
employment policy. 265 While this concern is certainly valid, 
several aspects of the reasonable accommodation approach 
should diminish this concern.  
First,  some statutes,  like Illinois’ VESSA266 and California’s 
SB 400,267 include extensive explications and definitions of both 
reasonable accommodation and undue burden. 268 The clearly 
                                                        
264 See Edward J. McGraw, Compliance Costs of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act,  18 DEL.  J.  CORP.  L. 521, 540 (1993) (arguing that the ADA 
would create an “onslaught of litigation” because the reasonable 
accommodation approach “specifically contemplates interpretation on a case-
by-case basis.”). 
265 See id.  (raising the argument in the context of the ADA).  
266 820 ILL.  COMP.  STAT.  180/1 (2012). 
267 S.B. 400, 2013–14 Cal. S.,  Reg. Session (Cal. 2013).  See also CAL.  
LAB.  CODE § 230 (West 2014). 
268 See, e.g. ,  HAW.  REV.  STAT.  §§ 378-81(a)(1)–(6) (2014) (defining 
reasonable accommodation by way of example, providing the following list of 
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articulated boundaries of reasonable and undue burden constrain 
judicial discretion in advance. 269 Further,  under clear statutory 
terms, employers’ attorneys are able to draft employment 
policies that are most likely to be determined compliant with the 
law. 270  Thus,  where reasonable accommodation statutes are 
drafted with clarity,  they decrease the likelihood of courts and 
management reaching different conclusions of the reasonableness 
of an accommodation.  
Second, some courts have already begun to investigate the 
fine line between reasonable accommodation and undue burden. 
In 2004, the New York County Supreme Court interpreted the 
reasonable accommodation requirement of the New York City 
Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”)271 for the first time in 
                                                        
examples: “[c]hanging the contact information . .  .  of the employee; 
[s]creening the telephone calls of the employee; [r]estructuring the job 
functions of the employee; [c]hanging the work location of the employee; 
[i]nstalling locks and other security devices; and [a]llowing the employee to 
work flexible hours”); OR.  REV.  STAT.  ANN.  § 659A.275 (2014) (“‘Undue 
hardship’ means a significant difficulty and expense to a covered employer’s 
business and includes consideration of the size of the employer’s business and 
the employer’s critical need for the eligible employee.”).  
269 A convincing criticism of the ADA is that “it contain[ed] many ill-
defined terms” and thus permitted wide judicial discretion that would increase 
employer’s litigation costs. McGraw, supra note 264,  at 539–40. History has 
proven this criticism correct. Carrie L. Flores, Note, A Disability Is Not A 
Trump Card: The Americans with Disabilities Act Does Not Entitle Disabled 
Employees to Automatic Reassignment,  43 VAL.  U.  L.  REV.  195, 207 (2008) 
(observing that the various ambiguous terms of the ADA resulted in 
numerous Circuit splits).  Flores goes on to note that the Supreme Court “has 
interpreted and qualified some of the statutory text, shedding light on 
mystifying terms and nuances.” Id.  at 209. Employers should learn from the 
history of the ADA and request that legislatures be clear in their definitions 
of covered employees, reasonable accommodations, and undue burdens.  
270 Cf.  The Americans with Disabilities Act: Great Progress, Greater 
Potential,  109 HARV.  L.  REV.  1602, 1615 (1996) (arguing that under the 
vagueness of the ADA, “[e]mployers [were forced to] choose between 
making the (perhaps needless) accommodations requested by disabled 
employees or applicants and risking costly litigation and potential liability for 
discrimination by refusing such requests”).  
271 N.Y.C.  ADMIN.  CODE §§ 8-107–107.1 (McKinney 2013). 
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Reynolds v.  Fraser. 272 There,  a former employee of the 
Department of Corrections brought an action accusing her 
employer of discrimination against her due to her status as a 
victim of domestic violence.273 In this case,  after increasing 
violence at home, plaintiff left her husband and began 
intermittent bouts of homelessness and refuge in shelters.274 
While at the shelter,  plaintiff required surgery and a period of 
convalescence. 275 Defendant-employer approved the sick leave 
but later terminated plaintiff due to her violation of a 
requirement to be present at her home during sick leave. 276 The 
court in Reynolds held that the Defendant-employer failed to 
reasonably accommodate the plaintiff as a victim-employee,  277 
and thus violated NYCHRL section 8-107.1(3)(a)’s requirement 
that “any [covered employer] . .  .  shall make reasonable 
accommodation to enable a person who is a victim of domestic 
violence .  .  .  to satisfy the essential requisites of a job.” 278 The 
court in Reynolds interpreted the reasonable accommodation 
provision of the NYCHRL to require that an employer waive a 
technical requirement (such as a requirement to remain home 
during sick leave) when the employer is on notice that the 
employee is a victim. 279 The Reynolds case represents the only 
occasion that a court has considered what a reasonable 
accommodation for the victim-employee is.  That said,  its 
holding appears fairly predictable and thus cuts against employer 
concerns that accommodation statutes will permit courts to 
widely second guess the decisions of management.   
Finally,  reasonable accommodation statutes with clearly 
                                                        
272 Reynolds v. Fraser, 781 N.Y.S.2d 885 (N.Y. Sup. 2004).  
273 Id.  at 885, 887.  
274 Id.  at 885–87. 
275 Id.  The court does not describe why the plaintiff required surgery. 
See Reynolds,  781 N.Y.S.2d at 885.  
276 Id.  at 891. 
277 Id.  at 887. 
278 N.Y.C.  ADMIN CODE § 8-107.1 (McKinney 2013). 
279 Reynolds, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 891. See also Harvey Randall, 
Discrimination, Domestic Violence Victims, Probationary Employee,  11 PUB.  
EMP.  L.  NOTES 206 (2004). 
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defined requirements actually allow employers to predict judicial 
outcomes and avoid litigation costs.  An example of this is 
discussed in the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of 
Hawaii’s testimony in support280 of Hawaii’s 2011 Senate Bill 
229 (“SB229”).281 SB229 was introduced in 2011 so as to 
require employers to reasonably accommodate victims of 
domestic violence. 282 In its testimony in support of SB229’s 
reasonable accommodation requirement,  the ACLU highlighted 
the success of New York City’s reasonable accommodation 
statute. 283 The ACLU of Hawaii recounts how the national 
ACLU represented a plaintiff who had been employed by New 
York City public school systems and needed to take time off of 
work to “attend court proceedings and seek medical 
treatment.”284 The plaintiff,  “Kathleen,” was reprimanded for 
excessive absenteeism. 285 Later,  the employee requested to 
transfer to another school “for safety reasons,” and “[s]hortly 
after this conversation, she was fired.”286 The ACLU of Hawaii 
reported that,  in the face of liability under NYCHRL, the school 
system settled the case and amended its internal policy to cover 
victims of domestic violence, “acknowledging that reasonable 
accommodations must be offered to these survivors,  and 
publicizing its new policies throughout the school system.”287 
The school system’s decision to settle may indicate that it felt it 
was clear that it had failed to provide a reasonable 
                                                        
280 Testimony of the ACLU of Hawaii in Support of S.B. 229, Relating to 
Employment Relations: Hearing on S.B. 229 Before the Comm. on Judiciary 
& Labor, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. (Haw. 2011) [hereinafter Testimony of the 
ACLU of Hawaii in Support of S.B. 229] (statement of Laurie A. Temple, 
Staff Att’y, ACLU of Hawaii),  available at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/ 
session2011/Testimony/SB229_TESTIMONY_JDL_LATE.pdf.  
281 S.B. 229, 2011 Leg. Sess. (Haw. 2011) (enacted).  
282 S.B. 229 was eventually passed and became effective January 1, 
2012.  See HAW.  REV.  STAT.  § 378-81(a) (2014).  
283 Testimony of the ACLU of Hawaii in Support of S.B. 229, supra note 
280, at 1.  
284 Id.  at 2. 
285 Id.  
286 Id.  
287 Id.  
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accommodation that was required by law. If that is the case,  
then Kathleen’s case,  as presented by the ACLU of Hawaii,  may 
indicate that reasonable accommodation statutes can provide 
employers with the ability to predict their likelihood of 
liability.288  
While employers are justifiably concerned that reasonable 
accommodation laws will permit judges to second-guess 
management decisions,  that concern should not guide them to 
wholesale reject accommodation laws. First, domestic violence 
accommodation statutes can be tailored to limit judicial 
discretion. Second, while the case law on the subject is very 
limited, the Reynolds case and Kathleen’s case indicate that the 
jurisprudence of reasonable accommodation of domestic violence 
victims could be predictable and limit lawsuits.   
 
3.  Intersection with Other Laws 
 
Another concern with the reasonable accommodation 
approach is that an employer,  who provides reasonable 
accommodations to some employees and not others,  may be in 
violation of other employment discrimination laws. 289 Consider 
the following hypothetical: an employer institutes a policy that 
provides accommodations for victims, and all covered employees 
are women. 290 Would a male employee prevail on a Title VII 
action sounding in sexual discrimination? In Muhammad v.  
Walmart,  the federal district court for the Western District of 
New York addressed this question and referred to a potential 
gender discrimination claim as “completely frivolous.” 291 Mr. 
                                                        
288 See id. 
289 See, e.g. ,  Muhammad v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., No. 10-CV-
6074-CJS, 2012 WL 5950368, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2012), rev’d and 
vacated sub nom. ,  No. 12-4773-CV, 2013 WL 5539924 (2d Cir. Oct. 9, 
2013) (reversed on other grounds). Muhammad v. Wal-Mart is discussed 
below. 
290 The overwhelming majority of victims are women.  Goldscheid, 
supra note 30, at 61, 63, 66.  It is therefore perfectly reasonable to imagine 
that for many employers, their only covered employees would be women.  
291 Wal-Mart terminated Mr. Muhammad’s employment after Mr. 
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Muhammad claimed gender discrimination based on the 
disparate treatment between his “angry outburst” and an earlier 
violent incident involving a female employee. 292 The female 
employee had arrived at work in the company of her intimate 
partner; they had a violent altercation wherein he struck her and 
shoved her through the entrance of the store; they then “yelled 
profanities at each other.” 293 Walmart had declined to take 
disciplinary action against the female employee because “it 
viewed her as being the victim of domestic violence.” 294 Judge 
Siragusa ultimately decided the gender discrimination claims 
were improperly pled but, in dicta,  opined that “even if they 
were pleaded, are completely frivolous.”295 This dictum may 
allow for the inference that if an employer reasonably 
accommodates by waiving the applicability of a rule for violence 
in the workplace,  that accommodation is unlikely to create 
liability under Title VII even when it applies a different 
disciplinary standard to a male employee during the same shift.  
In fact,  a reasonable accommodation approach may actually 
limit employer liability under other federal laws. Consider the 
following example: a manager who approaches a male employee 
about his absenteeism learns that the employee’s partner is 
terrorizing him.296 Without proper guidance, the manager allows 
gender bias to enter into her assessment of and response to the 
                                                        
Muhammad angrily confronted his supervisor, threw his identification on the 
floor, and left work in the middle of his shift,  and in front of customers. 
Muhammad,  2012 WL 5950368, at *2.  Mr. Muhammad, acting pro se, filed 
a complaint sounding in racial and disability discrimination. Id.  at *4.  
During the pendency of litigation Mr. Muhammad’s attorney purported that 
there was a claim for gender discrimination. Id. at *5. The district court 
sanctioned the attorney for improperly raising what he termed a “completely 
frivolous” and unplead cause of action. Id. at *6. On appeal, the Second 
Circuit vacated the sanctions but did not speak to the merits of the claim. 
Muhammad,  2013 WL 5539924. 
292 Muhammad, 2012 WL 5950368, at *3, *5.  
293 Id.  at *3. 
294 Id.   
295 Id.  at *6. 
296  This example is a modification of an example given by the EEOC. 
See EEOC Fact Sheet, supra note 125, at *2. 
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situation. 297 She perceives the male employee as weak and 
terminates him. This fact pattern,  which was included in the 
EEOC Fact Sheet,  would expose the employer to liability under 
Title VII because the manager’s action is based on gender 
stereotypes. 298 However,  a reasonable accommodation law can 
be drafted so as to require that a victim-employee who requests 
an accommodation must first document that they are a victim of 
an incident of domestic violence. 299 As such, in this fact pattern, 
the manager and the employee would have already had a 
conversation about the violence, and the manager would be on 
notice that they are required to reasonably accommodate the 
employee. She would therefore be less likely to make a snap 
decision, 300 which could expose the employer to liability.  An 
accommodation statute that requires an interactive process 
“ensure[s] that any adverse employment action is based on 
legitimate reasons,  as opposed to subtle biases.” 301 The 
reasonable accommodation approach may therefore avoid 
employer liability under other employment legislation.  
In sum, the reasonable accommodation approach is best 
tailored to employer’s interests.  An accommodation statute can 
include limiting provisions that ensure that employers only incur 
small accommodation costs.  Further,  an accommodation statute 
can ensure that there is a dialogue between the victim-employee 
and management.  Qualitative studies also demonstrate that this 
dialogue may help the victim-employee gain access to 
community resources and begin the project of leaving their 
abuser.  Ultimately,  this would achieve employers’ greatest 
interest: to limit the way that domestic violence affects the 
bottom line by encouraging victim-employees to take affirmative 
steps to ending the violence in their lives and returning to their 
full level of productivity.   
 
                                                        
297 See Goldscheid, supra note 30, at 62. 
298 See EEOC Fact Sheet, supra note 125, at *2; see also supra note 
129.  
299 See supra statutes cited in note 176 and accompanying text.  
300 Schwab & Willborn, supra note 236, at 1258–60.  
301 Goldscheid, supra note 30, at 62. See also id.  at 114–18.  
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CONCLUSION  
 
As the employment landscape shifts around them, employers 
should reconsider their position on employment protections for 
victims of domestic violence. To date employers have opposed 
employment protections at the state level, 302 but there are two 
convincing reasons why this position is untenable. First, 
domestic violence negatively impacts employers’ business 
because it cuts into their bottom line; domestic violence 
decreases productivity,  increases turnover,  and can even result 
in violence at the workplace. 303 While some employers have 
taken steps to address domestic violence internally, 304 legislation 
that would require all employers to provide employment 
protections would better serve the business community. 305 
Without a law, smaller,  resource-poor employers are unable to 
avail themselves of internal policies. 306 Further,  employers that 
do address the problem internally are penalized in the market.307 
Instead, legislation would serve the business community because 
it would normalize the cost of accommodating victim-employees 
in the workplace; thus ameliorating domestic violence’s effect on 
all employers’ businesses,  not merely those that can afford to 
address the problem internally.308 Second,  the federal 
government has signaled that it supports employment protections 
for victims of domestic violence. 309 If a federal law is imminent, 
now is the perfect opportunity for employers to enter into the 
debate and shape the way that the statute is drafted. 310 
                                                        
302 See supra notes 10–12, 84 and accompanying text. 
303 See supra notes 30–61 and accompanying text. 
304 See supra notes 75–83 and accompanying text. 
305 See generally supra Part I.A. 
306 See supra notes 92, 97–99 and accompanying text. 
307 See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. 
308 See supra notes 88–96, 186–97 and accompanying text. 
309 See supra notes 66–74, 125, 127–39, and accompanying text. 
310 See supra notes 17–19, 104–08 and accompanying text (discussing 
how the 2013 session of the New York Senate provides an example of how 
employer advocacy can mean the difference between a law that requires 
providing reasonable leave or three months of leave).  
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If employers do reconsider their position and begin to 
advocate for limited legislation,  they should look to state statutes 
for guidance. As has been seen at the state level,  domestic 
violence statutes,  particularly the statutory leave and reasonable 
accommodation statutes,  can be drafted so as to trade short-term 
costs with long-term benefits.  The antidiscrimination approach, 
on the other hand, is not deserving of support because it is 
fundamentally reliant on classifications and not aimed at 
solutions. 311 Employers have more to gain from a statute that 
requires affirmative actions that correct the problem.  
The statutory leave approach has thus far been the most 
popular approach312 at the state level and is deserving of 
employer support.  There are good reasons for this.  First,  where 
a statutory leave law is drafted so as to only provide leave for 
enumerated reasons and require documentation that the leave is 
used for that reason, employers can be sure that employees will 
not misuse the leave. 313 Second, statutory leave laws can be 
drafted so as to require reasonable notice of leave; this ensures 
that employer operations are not disrupted by the leave. 314 Third, 
the statutory leave approach includes only minor administrative 
costs. 315 Finally, statutory leave laws have proven amenable to 
the concern that smaller employers will be disparately impacted; 
this is accomplished either by exempting the smallest employers 
or by providing different requirements for employers of different 
sizes. 316 In sum, employers should consider supporting a 
statutory leave law, provided that it:  
(1) clearly enumerates the reasons for leave so as to permit 
employers to discipline employees who attempt to abuse 
the law;317  
(2) shifts administrative costs onto employees by requiring 
                                                        
311 See supra Part IV.B. 
312 See statutes cited supra note 148. 
313 See supra notes 160–68 and accompanying text. 
314 See statutes cited supra note 176 (discussing notice requirements).  
315 See supra notes 177–85 and accompanying text. 
316 See supra notes 186–97 and accompanying text. 
317 For examples of how such a provision should be drafted, see the 
statutes cited supra at notes 161–64.  
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advance notice of leave or documentation that the leave 
was taken because of imminent physical injury;318  
(3) permits only a reasonable amount of time that does not 
create an undue burden on the employer;319 and  
(4) requires certification of reasonableness by either a 
medical,  legal,  or social work professional. 320 
While the reasonable accommodation approach has thus far 
been the least popular approach, 321 it is,  in fact,  best suited to 
achieving employers’ interests.  First,  the reasonable 
accommodation approach necessarily considers the costs that 
employers bear.322 Second, reasonable accommodation statutes 
can be drafted so as to only require low-cost accommodations.323 
Third,  the long-term benefits of the reasonable accommodation 
approach far outweigh the slight initial costs. 324 Finally, 
reasonable accommodation statutes can be drafted so as to 
require a dialogue—or interactive process—between the victim-
employee and management. 325 This interactive process has a 
                                                        
318 Such a provision would permit employers to require advance notice of 
leave except when the leave is not foreseeable, such as “in cases of imminent 
danger to the health or safety of the employee.” See, e.g., COLO.  REV.  STAT.  
§ 24-34-402.7(2)(a) (2013).  If the employee takes emergency leave without 
advance notice, the employer would be permitted to require the employee to 
provide certification that the leave was taken for an appropriate reason. See 
CAL.  LAB.  CODE § 230.1(b)(1)–(2) (West 2014). This documentation could 
be a police report,  a court order, or documentation from a medical 
professional. See id.  § 230(b)(2)(A)–(C). See generally statutes cited supra 
note 176.  
319 Reasonable leave statutes are a hybrid of the statutory leave and 
reasonable accommodation approaches, and provide the benefits of each. For 
a discussion of reasonable leave statutes, see supra notes 158, 193–97 and 
accompanying text. For a discussion of the benefit of clear statutory 
definitions of reasonableness and undue burden, see supra notes 238–45. 
320 Hawaii provides an example of how this requirement would work. 
See HAW.  REV.  STAT. § 378-72(b) (2014); see also supra note 197 and 
accompanying text.  
321 See statutes cited supra notes 223–28. 
322 See supra notes 238–45 and accompanying text.  
323 See supra notes 246–49 and accompanying text. 
324 See generally supra Part V.B. 
325 See supra notes 248–63 and accompanying text. 
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positive impact on employee loyalty and productivity.  In sum, 
employers should consider supporting a reasonable 
accommodation law provided that it:  
(1) limits putative accommodations to a finite list,  such as 
changing an employee’s telephone number or workstation 
and/or installing safety devices;326  
(2) clearly defines factors to be considered in making a 
determination of undue burden, such as cost of the 
accommodation and/or size of the employer;327 
(3) clearly articulates that any accommodation that would 
require the employer to jeopardize the safety of their 
workplace is unduly burdensome;328  
(4) requires that a requesting employee document their status 
as a victim of domestic violence;329 and 
(5) requires an interactive process between the employer and 
the victim-employee as to what a reasonable 
accommodation for that particular employee would be. 330 
Domestic violence is a workplace problem. 331 In 2009, 
“twenty-nine percent of male workers and forty percent of 
female workers reported having been victims of domestic 
violence .  .  .  .”332 Domestic violence disrupts employers’ 
businesses,  affects their bottom line,  and costs between $3 and 
$13 billion per year in lost profits. 333 The time has come for 
employers and their advocates to support legislation that 
                                                        
326 See, e.g.,  CAL.  LAB.  CODE § 230(f)(2) (West 2014). As discussed 
above, employers should advocate for a statute that requires only a finite list 
of accommodations. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
327 See, e.g. , 820 ILL.  COMP.  STAT.  180/30(b)(4)(B)(i)–(iv) (2012); see 
also supra notes 233, 238–41 and accompanying text.  
328 See, e.g. , CAL.  LAB.  CODE § 230(f)(6) (West 2014); see also supra 
notes 242–45 and accompanying text.  
329 See, e.g. , HAW.  REV.  STAT.  § 378-81(b) (2014). 
330 See, e.g. , CAL.  LAB.  CODE § 230(f)(5) (West 2014); see also supra 
note 255 and accompanying text. 
331 For other scholars reaching the same conclusion from the perspective 
of the employee and society see generally Widiss, supra note 6; Karin, supra 
note 6; and Randel & Wells, supra note 48. 
332 Jacobs & Raghu, supra note 20, at 597. 
333 See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.  
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addresses this workplace problem. The time has come for 
employers to support legislation that provides employment 
protections to victim-employees without imposing too great a 
cost on business.  
 
